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ABSTRACT 
 This study investigates China’s use of non-military instruments of statecraft in 
Micronesia in order to assess the Chinese government’s motives and methods for greater 
regional presence. By exploring China’s use of diplomacy, economic measures, and 
information operations in the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and 
Palau over the past three decades, this thesis seeks to explain China’s current and 
aspirational maritime security objectives beyond the South China Sea and contribute to 
debates on the Chinese Communist Party’s motives and approaches for gaining strategic 
advantages vis-à-vis the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. The research in this 
thesis leverages concepts of modern political warfare, theories of state-driven 
geo-economics strategy and psychological effects-based operations to assess China’s 
engagements in Micronesian states as indicators of great power competition with the 
United States. It finds that China’s approach to political warfare in the region has become 
increasingly focused on leveraging state-owned enterprises and economic inducements 
toward the fishing industries of lesser-developed Micronesian states in order to secure 
access, grow capacities for displacing American placement and influence, and impose 
long-term costs and risks to the sustainment of U.S. forward security positions. 
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To commemorate 30 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries, 
Ambassador Huang Zheng of the People’s Republic of China recently authored an opinion 
piece in Kaselehie Press—the national newspaper of the Federated States of Micronesia.1
In his statement to Micronesians, Ambassador Zheng praises three decades of mutual 
respect, fruitful achievements, and adherence to the One China Principle as “the most 
fundamental cornerstone of the China-FSM Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.”2 The
Ambassador subsequently denounces “ungrounded criticisms” of China-FSM relations 
driven by bitter and “colonialist” countries “that distort the facts and overturn the right with 
the wrong.”3 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
This study aims to provide a deeper understanding of approaches employed by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to displace American presence and influence in the Pacific 
Islands. The United States has maintained exclusive defense cooperation with FSM and the 
rest of Micronesia since the end of the Second World War; however, Ambassador Zheng’s 
messaging suggests that the CCP is in a contest to win the hearts and minds of local 
populations which could lead to a weakening of American collective security arrangements. 
This research contributes to assessments of China’s strategic competition with the United 
States by answering the following question: what do Chinese engagements in Micronesia 
over the past three decades indicate about the CCP’s approach to great power competition 
with the United States in the broader Indo-Pacific? 
1 Huang Zheng, “FSM and China Celebrate 30 Years of Diplomatic Relations,” Pacific Island Times, 
September 08, 2019, https://www.pacificislandtimes.com/single-post/2019/09/08/FSM-and-China-
celebrate-30-years-of-diplomatic-relations. 
2 The “One China Principle” (commonly translated as One China Policy) declares that Taiwan as a 
component part of China, possesses neither the recognition nor rights of a sovereign state. Zheng.  
3 Zheng, “FSM and China Celebrate 30 Years of Diplomatic Relations.” 
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B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This study investigates China’s use of non-military instruments of statecraft in 
Micronesia in order to assess the Chinese government’s motives and methods for greater 
regional presence. By exploring China’s use of diplomacy, economic measures, and 
information operations in the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and 
Palau over the past three decades, this thesis seeks to explain China’s current and 
aspirational maritime security objectives beyond the South China Sea and contribute to 
debates on the Chinese Communist Party’s motives and approaches for gaining strategic 
advantages vis-à-vis the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. The research in this thesis 
leverages concepts of modern political warfare, theories of state-driven geo-economics 
strategy and psychological effects-based operations to assess China’s engagements in 
Micronesian states as indicators of great power competition with the United States. It finds 
that China’s approach to political warfare in the region has become increasingly focused on 
leveraging state-owned enterprises and economic inducements towards the fishing 
industries of lesser-developed Micronesian states in order to secure access, grow capacities 
for displacing American placement and influence, and impose long-term costs and risks to 
the sustainment of U.S. forward security positions. 
C. IMPORTANCE 
This research addresses three interconnected issues currently facing the United 
States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), U.S. interagency teams supporting 
political and economic development in Oceania, and partners seeking to mitigate 
geopolitical tensions with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). From local to global, these 
issues include maintaining strong relations and agreements with small Pacific Island 
Countries (PICs) amidst increasing Chinese influence; maintaining forward presence for 
national security and collective defense; and maintaining resilient coalitions that support a 
continuation and strengthening of a rules-based international order.  
1. Maintaining Relations
The United States maintains atypical relations with the Micronesian nations of 
Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia which have served as 
3 
the foundation for U.S. presence in the Central Pacific since the 1980s. These three 
independent countries “in free association with the U.S.” provide the United States with 
strategically important access to operate militarily within their territorial borders as well as 
the authority to deny third-party countries access for military purposes. 4  In return, the
United States guarantees national defense and contribute towards the economic 
development of each partner while also granting special status for citizens to work and live 
as non-immigrants in the United States or its territories. The United States has already 
recognized the need to examine and bolster these relations; however, many still raise 
concerns over a lack of real political appreciation for these partners, a lack of tangible 
successes in their development, and a lack of clarity on the CCP’s potential to undermine 
U.S.-Micronesian relations over time.5 
2. Maintaining National and Collective Security
The trans-pacific sea lines of communication (SLOC) network, demonstrated in 
Figure 1, supports both U.S.-led collective security interests in the region as well as national 
defense. In addition to the three Compact countries, Micronesia is home to the U.S. 
territories of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) which 
serve as platforms for force projection and strategic deterrence. In recent decades, the CCP 
has used a mix of non-conventional methods for expanding its territorial sovereignty, and 
by doing so, has reinvigorated concerns within the U.S. security establishment regarding 
possible efforts to establish an “Offshore Defense”.6 Chinese efforts to displace Japanese
and Philippine maritime control in areas of the East and South China Seas (SCS) creates 
dilemmas for U.S. decision making between defending the territorial sovereignty of its allies 
4 United States Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea: Testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. (2017) (Statement of Admiral Harry Harris, Commander U.S. 
Pacific Command). 
5 Dean Cheng, “Countering Chinese Inroads into Micronesia,” Heritage Foundation, October 27, 2016, 
http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/countering-chinese-inroads-micronesia; see also Full Committee 
Hearing on the Freely Associated: Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 116th Cong. (2019) (Statement of Randall Schriver, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
Pacific Security Affairs). 
6 Daniel M. Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci, “Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: An Analysis of 
Chinese Views Since the Early 1990s,” in The Chinese Navy, ed. Saunders, Yung, Swaine, and Yang 
(Washington, DC, : National Defense University Press, 2011), 100. 
4 
and risking an escalation of conflict. Furthermore, the CCP arguably seeks to militarily and 
politically “squeeze democratic Taiwan out of existence,” which challenges a permeant 
imperative of U.S. foreign policy to ensure a non-coercive resolution to the Taiwan-PRC 
issue.7 A potential extension of China’s maritime contest beyond the SCS both expands 
China’s leverage in the geopolitical space and escalates dilemmas by introducing additional 
costs and risk to established force projection and deterrence schemes.  
 
Figure 1. Pacific Countries with Full- or Part-Time U.S. Military Presence.8 
 
7 Ben Lowsen, “Is it Time for the United States to Recognize Taiwan?” The Diplomat, June 29, 2019, 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/is-it-time-for-the-united-states-to-recognize-taiwan/. 
8 Ben Kesling, “Leaders of Three Strategic Pacific Islands Plan Joint Visit to U.S.,” Wall Street 
Journal, May 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/leaders-of-three-strategic-pacific-islands-plan-joint-
visit-to-u-s-11557931878. 
5 
3. Maintaining the Rules-Based International Order
To some observers, including the current Commander of INDOPACOM, those who 
see China’s threat as merely a growing military competition between an established power 
and a rising power “are not seeing the whole picture.”9 China’s state-sponsored activities in
the SCS and against Taiwan not only highlight security dilemmas but also demonstrate its 
government’s ability and willingness to undermine established institutions and norms to 
advance national agendas. In the SCS China has built islands, dismissed international 
arbitration, encouraged maritime militias, and interfered in the domestic law enforcement 
of other nations all while expanding military anti-access area denial (A2AD). If the United 
States fails to recognize and address similar types of activities beyond the SCS, then it may 
unwittingly allow for precedent that current security providers will no longer deter coercion 
so long as the means employed are non-military in essence. Perhaps this is a component of 
what Admiral Davidson warns as “a fundamental divergence in values that leads to 
incompatible visions of the future.”10  
The purpose of this research is not to conflate the CCP’s far seas engagements with 
the assertive acts taken in its near sea’s disputes. The authors believe that a fine line exists 
between state competition and conflict and that mischaracterizing China’s approach only 
exacerbates dilemmas. The goal of this research is not to undercut legitimate competition 
but rather to distinguish unique aspects of the CCP’s approach to shaping foreign 
environments where motives of assertive displacement may exist beyond the scope of near-
term areas of emphasis. By better understanding the range of activities that China conducts 
with and within the Pacific Island region, this research seeks to illuminate not only 
implications on established U.S. security arrangements, but on the resilience of U.S. values 
and interests in these areas more broadly.  
9 Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. INDO-Pacific Command Posture, 
116th Cong. (2019) (Statement by Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander, INDOPACOM).  
10 Ibid. 
6 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As previously stated, this thesis aims to answer what China’s state-sponsored 
engagements in Micronesia over three decades indicate about the CCP’s approach to great 
power competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific. This work seeks to satisfy the 
main question through qualitative analysis of the following related sub-questions: 
RQ1. What are China’s interests, motives, and objectives for expanding presence and 
influence in Oceania? 
RQ2. To what extent do activities in Micronesia affirm or refute claims that the CCP aims 
to displace American power, influence, and values? 
RQ3. How have China’s state-sponsored engagements impacted the local political 
decision-making behaviors of Pacific island nations? 
 The intent of sub-questions is to generate and development of the most relevant 
cases of study study for deeper analysis. The research sub-questions were developed to 
further guide the research from identifying the most relevant aspects of China’s interests 
at a broad, regional level covering the past 30 years into a more specific analysis of 
actions and approaches taken by the CCP.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The authors organize this study to provide increasingly narrower analysis of China’s 
foreign engagements in the Central Pacific. Chapter II begins by explaining the range of 
views that experts and scholars maintain regarding China’s expanding power and forecasted 
relations with the United States. The chapter includes overviews of theoretical foundations 
as well as a literature review of past research used to guide our own. Chapter II also provides 
the rationale for Micronesia as an appropriate case for assessing Chinese gray zone activities 
in the context of GPC. Chapter III frames the analysis of the study by providing hypotheses 
and methods for conducting comparative analysis of interests, instruments, and strategies. 
Chapters IV and V focus on successively narrowed case-studies of China’s motives and 
methods for gaining and leveraging regional influence—beginning at a regional level of 
7 
analysis (Chapter IV) and moving through country, community, and program-centric case 
studies (Chapter V). Each chapter is also organized to explore and provide insights into a 
specific sub-question of the research topic. Chapter IV examines the various political, 
economic, and security interests that select countries have within the region of Oceania and 
explains where and how interests overlap within Micronesia. Chapter V provides an 
inventory and assessment of Chinese state-sponsored activities within the Compact states 
and assesses where and how the CCP employs instruments of statecraft to advance or 
achieve objectives by employing theoretical concept models of political warfare and sharp 
power. Chapter VI provides a summary of findings, analysis, conclusions, and 
recommendations for future research.  
F. HYPOTHESES 
This study looks at a combination of six core hypotheses to determine whether and 
how the Chinese Communist Party engages in political warfare to shape the foreign policies 
and perceptions of small island nations against U.S. security positions and interests in the 
Pacific. 
H1: The CCP leverages coercive diplomatic, economic, and psychological statecraft in 
concerted campaigns to weaken Compacts of Free Association agreements between the 
U.S., Palau, FSM, and RMI. 
H2: China’s political objectives in the central Pacific grow more assertive and antithetical 
to American interests as countries become more dependent on Chinese trade and capital 
flows. 
H3: China’s economic engagements in Micronesia have limited potential for economic 
return, but notable capacity for political opportunity and leverage.  
H4: China’s foreign engagement and volume of public diplomacy within Micronesia 
increases during periods of political dispute with the United States.  
H5: China increases tangible support to local actors who take outspoken positions against 
U.S. policies. 
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H6: The CCP utilizes misinformation to obscure its strategic intentions and activities in 
Micronesia. 
These hypotheses from the basis of the overall assessment of this study. Information 
collected within each country study and case study will serve as evidence for either 
validating or discounting each hypothesis and the validated hypotheses taken together will 
help to better characterize and validate strategies and methods sponsored by the CCP. 
G. HINGE ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS  
While a range of alternative premises for assessment were considered, this thesis 
presupposes that the United States and China are dually engaged in a long-term strategic 
competition for power, influence, and prestige on the international stage. The term “great 
power competition” broadly encompasses the United States’ doctrine for furthering and 
maintaining vital interests within this paradigm; however, GPC presently lacks clear policy, 
prescriptive guidance, and a clear strategic conceptualization.11 This work uses concepts 
provided by English military historian Sir Basil Liddell Hart on strategy, grand strategy, and 
approaches to strategic competition as a conceptual starting point for assessing U.S.-China 
GPC. Hart’s “notable works on the indirect approach provide the following definitions and 
distinctions: 
Strategy—“The art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war.”12  
Grand Strategy—“Policy which guides the conduct of war. The role of grand strategy is to 
co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the 
attainment of the political object of the war.”13 
 
11 Ali Wyne, “The Need to Think More Clearly About ‘Great-Power Competition,’” The RAND 
(Blog), February 11, 2019, https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/02/the-need-to-think-more-clearly-about-great-
power-competition.html. 
12 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd. ed. (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1967), 333. 
13 Ibid., 335. 
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Instruments—“Within the context of grand strategy, military capability is combined with 
economic, political, and psychological “weapons” to achieve conflict objectives.”14  
Dislocation—“A strategic situation so advantageous that it either produces the political 
object of the approach without further contest or ensures that a continuation of the contest 
through military force would be certain to. The sequel of dislocation may be either the 
enemy’s dissolution or its easier disruption in battle.”15  
According to Liddell Hart, the aim of grand strategy is not to seek battle but 
dislocation as dislocation facilitates responsible use of a nation’s resources.16 
H. LIMITATIONS 
Because no standard or  fully comprehensive data source for overseas investment 
and aid in Micronesia exists, we consult and consolidate multiple sources to include those 
maintained by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), AidData—Research Lab at The 
College of William and Mary, the Lowy Institute, the Center for Strategic International 
Studies (CSIS), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD),17
and the major multinational development banks.  
14 Ibid., 351, Hart describes such objectives as “war policy” or the political object of war which are 
distinguished from the more limited military aims. 
15 Ibid., 339. 
16 Ibid. 
17 “China Global Investment Tracker, “American “Pacific Aid Map,” Lowy Institute,  accessed April 
22, 2019 https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/; “China Power Project,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2019, https://www.csis.org/programs/china-power-project. 
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II. LITERATURE AND CASE SELECTION
Prior to reviewing China’s interests and activities in Micronesia, this Chapter 
outlines the theoretical foundations and past research that serve as a basis to the approach of 
this work. The chapter also outlines the methods used for developing and testing hypotheses 
and rationale used for case selection.  
A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
1. Views on China
This assessments of China’s activities in the central Pacific extends as a continuation 
of debates regarding the international role that Chinese officials want the nation to fill more 
broadly. After serving as Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, political scholar 
Aaron Friedberg wrote that most analysis on China deploys arguments from one of the three 
main camps of international relations theory, but within each camp are also both optimistic 
and pessimistic outlooks over whether China’s foreign aims and acts will trend toward 
greater peace and stability or confrontation and conflict over time (Figure 2).18  
Figure 2. Theoretical Perspectives on U.S.–China Relations19 
18 Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International 
Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–45, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137594. 
19 Ibid., 39. 
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Friedberg argues that the factors espoused by each theoretical perspective as 
essential causal mechanisms of either cooperation or competition collide with one another 
to produce dynamic realities between the two pure conditions (Figure 3). For pessimists, 
shifting power relations, mutual hostilities, and suspicion exacerbate competition while 
optimists look toward trade, institutions, local balancing, and technology as “peace-
producing” mechanisms.20  
 
 
Figure 3. Contending Causal Factors 
Friedberg’s bracketing of analytical perspectives and identification of causal 
mechanisms guide this research in the development and testing of alternative hypotheses.  
This research begins from a “realist-pessimist” perspective that China’s power is 
rising, its aims are expanding, and security dilemmas between the U.S. and China are 
intensifying. Traditional security-focused views within this frame often fixate on comparing 
military power in direct conflict and see China as building up combat power and positional 
advantage to challenge U.S. military access and power projection while also asserting de 
facto sovereignty over disputed space.21 Alternative thinking dedicates more value and 
attention to the premise that China seeks political objections while minimizing escalations 
toward armed conflict altogether through an exercising of power in a “gray zone” of 
competition situated between peace and war.22 This research examines evidence supporting 
 
20 Ibid., 41. 
21 United States Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea: Testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. (2017) (Statement of Admiral Harry Harris, Commander U.S. 
Pacific Command). 
22 U.S. INDO-PACIFIC Command Posture: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
116th Cong. (2019) (Statement by Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander, INDOPACOM). 
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each of these perspectives foremost while also considering claims and evidence from the 
range of alternative perspectives.  
2. Competition Short of Violent Conflict  
Aside from military capability, states leverage diplomacy, economics, and 
information to achieve foreign policy interests.23 Long before professor Harold Lasswell 
suggested these categorical classifications or Clausewitz reminded us that war is politics by 
other means, Thucydides described the integration and balancing of these instruments c. 432 
BC after Athenian economic sanctions against the Megarians, coalition building, and fear 
drove Sparta into the Peloponnesian War.24 Thucydides’ accounting of debate surrounding 
the Megara decree demonstrates one of the earliest examples of states leveraging their 
respective tools of national power to minimize weaknesses and maximize strengths in 
strategic competition through processes called statecraft. 25  In western perspectives, 
statecraft leverages diplomatic, military, economic, and psychological instruments either 
coercively or persuasively against other powerbrokers in the international arena.  
Military capability, economic capital, natural resources, and other tangible resources 
employed in statecraft constitute an exercise of hard power, where a state aims to coerce 
another actor to “do something that [the latter] would not do otherwise.”26 Soft power, by 
contrast, occurs when states leverage diplomacy, ideas, values, culture or other intangible 
instruments of attraction to “[get] other countries to want what it wants.”27 In the decades 
since Joseph Nye introduced soft power as a means of securing foreign interests, “smart 
power” and “sharp power” concepts emerged as experts dialogued and policy making 
sought the integration of hard and soft power into comprehensive strategies. Smart power 
 
23 Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? (United States: Meridian, 1958), 202. 
24 Victor D. Hanson, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 195. 
25 Robert Van de Velde, “Instruments of Statecraft,” Association of the United States Army 
Publication (December 1962), 53–56. 
26 Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (January 2007): 201–25, 
https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303.  
27 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (Autumn 1990): 166. 
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generally describes the integration of defense, diplomacy, and development programs to 
advance free trade, human rights, collective security alliances, and institution-building in 
order to guarantee democratic interests and U.S. security.28 While experts rarely still use the 
term, the conceptual application of smart power is still very present in the formation of U.S. 
strategy. 29  Alternatively, political observers increasingly use the term sharp power to 
discuss and describe China’s strategies and policies abroad. 30  Contrasting with the 
liberalizing and democratizing nature of smart power, sharp power characterizes the malign 
and assertive nature of authoritarian regimes to employ instruments to “subvert, bully, or 
pressure other actors into self-censorship” without the application of military force.31 While 
helpful for bringing renewed attention and scrutiny to China’s grey zone approaches, 
concepts of sharp power have long existed both within military contexts of psychological 
operations as well as outside of military contexts as information operations extending from 
political warfare. 
3. Foundations of Political Warfare  
In the view of famed statesman George Kennan, “political warfare is the 
employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national 
objectives.” 32  Kennan brought renewed emphasis on non-military approaches of 
competition by advocating a prolonged, low-end, and ideological competition with the 
Soviet Union which aimed to achieve what he termed a “capitalist encirclement” of 
 
28 Suzanne Nossel, “Smart Power,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March 2004): 131–143; Joseph Nye,  
“Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs 88, no.4 (July 2009); Francisco Wong-
Diaz, Smart Power and U.S. National Strategy, Report 13–3 (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University 
Press, 2013), 22–25.  
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept of Integrated Campaigning (Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of 
Staff, 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Concepts/; Department of State/ U.S. Agency for 
International Development, Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018–2022 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 
2018), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/JSP_FY_2018_-_2022_FINAL.pdf. 
30 Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “From Soft Power to Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian 
Influence in the Democratic World,” National Endowment for Democracy, December 5, 2017, 
https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-report/. 
31 Joseph Nye, “China’s Soft and Sharp Power,” Project Syndicate (Blog), January 4, 2018, 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-soft-and-sharp-power-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-01. 
32 George Kennan, “269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum” (official Memorandum, Washington, 
DC: National Security Council, 1948), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269.  
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America’s post WWII rival.33 Kennan aided the orchestration of political warfare against
the Soviets as a policy planner for the reconstruction of Europe under Secretary of State 
George Marshall and President Harry Truman.34 The Recovery of Europe Program (known
commonly as the Marshall Plan) that the Truman administration championed in the late 
1940s is by many measures the last integrated grand strategy campaign of the United States. 
It is also often used to provide a helpful case and criteria for assessing China’s contemporary 
economic development agenda.35 
4. Economic Statecraft
Political warfare since Kennan’s conceptualization has increasingly demonstrated 
linkages between state competition and the employment of “economic measures” as key 
instruments.36 Political scientists now refer to Kennan’s economic measures as economic
statecraft, defined as the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals.37 Political
economist David Baldwin, an early champion for the importance of economic instruments 
of power, argues that historical emphasis on coercive or “negative” instruments in 
competition contexts often overlook “positive sanctions” as a means of exercising power.38
Baldwin’s characterization of trade and capital as instruments of power (Figure 4) allows 
for deeper analysis and a growing recognition that economic instruments of statecraft are at 
least as relevant to achieving policy objectives as diplomatic and military tools.39  
33 George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947), 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=3629.
34 Melvyn Leffler, “Divide and Invest: Why the Marshall Plan Worked,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 
2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2018-06-14/divide-and-invest.
35 Simon Shen, “How China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Compares to the Marshall Plan,” The Diplomat, 
February 6, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/how-chinas-belt-and-road-compares-to-the-marshall-
plan/. 
36 Kennan, “269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum.” 
37 David Baldwin, “Economic Statecraft,” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 4, 2015, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/economic-statecraft.  
38 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
39 Michael Mastanduno, “Economic statecraft, Interdependence, and National Security: Agendas for 
Research,” Security Studies 9, no. 1 (December 24, 2007): 288–316, doi: 10.1080/09636419908429402. 
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Figure 4. Examples of Economic Statecraft: Positive Sanctions40 
Some observers and academic circles look at economic statecraft through a slightly 
more encompassing lens and prefer to use the term geo-economics “to describe the 
admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce.” 41 Edward Luttwak 
argues that contrary to geostrategic concepts such as mercantilism, where states seek 
resources as a “subordinate modality” to military backed international status, geo-
economics “have no superior modality.” 42  Geo-economics perspectives maintain that 
global power today is characterized by economic competition with realists emphasizing use 
of economic means for relative power and liberal views contending that states can establish 
international leadership and control by setting the standards and agendas for multinational 
economic integration.43  
Mikael Wigell offers a framework for conducting comparative assessments of geo-
economics strategies for regional actors, as shown in Figure 5.  
 
40 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 42. 
41 Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
Commerce,” The National Interest, no. 20 (Summer 1990): 17–23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42894676.  
42 Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics,” 18. 
43 Mark Beeson and Jinghan Zeng, “The BRICS and Global Governance: China’s Contradictory 
Role,” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 10 (October 3, 2018): 1962–78, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1438186. 
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Figure 5. Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geo-economics Strategies44 
Wigell’s framework demands analysis toward whether states employ economic 
instruments cooperatively or competitively and whether the use of economic power in 
competition reflects statecraft for broader political goals or economic dominance 
specifically. 
In competition, efforts directed at control of markets signify a neo-mercantilist 
strategy, while neo-imperialism seeks to create an “informal” empire through the 
establishment and control of new rules and norms.45 The distinguishing tactics in a neo-
imperialist strategy include coercion, bribery, and imposition, with the latter method defined 
as “when [economic] asymmetry is so great that the weaker state’s position is that of a 
vassal on which the regional power does not need to use either force or coercion to make 
the weaker state acquiesce.”46 Wigell also provides a useful null test for geo-economics
strategy by offering that “economic power is clearly a means to other ends when regional 
powers invest considerable resources in an exchange for political influence without a clear 
prospect of economic returns on investment.”47 
44 Mikael Wigell, Asia Europe Journal 14, no. 2 (June 2016): 142. 
45 Mikael Wigell. “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geo-Economic Strategies: Neo-Imperialism, 
Neo-Mercantilism, Hegemony, and Liberal Institutionalism,” Asia Europe Journal 14, no. 2 (June 2016): 
135–51, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-015-0442-x. 142–143. 
46 Wigell, “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geo-Economic Strategies,” 148. 
47 Wigell, “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geo-Economic Strategies,” 151. 
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5. Information Operations and Psychological Warfare 
U.S. Army Colonel Robert Van de Velde once wrote that the psychological 
instrument of statecraft is set apart from the others because psychological statecraft “tends 
to transcend all other activities in the realm of foreign affairs.”48  Joseph Nye pushed back 
on the idea of sharp power as a novel concept by contending that it merely highlights a form 
of coercion which has always existed—hard power by way of information warfare. 49 
Unfortunately, the concept that describes actors leveraging information and persuasion to 
achieve policy objectives goes by many names and debate over terminology is endless.50 
Carnes Lord, a prominent American military and political strategist, argues that there has 
been very little consensus on the role of psychological instruments in peacetime since the 
Korean War and further notes that a characteristic weakness of the American approach to 
competition is the “tendency to draw sharp distinctions between wartime and peacetime.”51 
Researchers from RAND offer a stopgap solution for the consensus issue in a research 
project intended to examine and explain modern political warfare. After analysis of the 
psychological statecraft and debates surrounding it, RAND proposes regarding information 
as the instrument category on par with diplomacy, economics, and military, uses the term 
propaganda to describe information intended to shape collective predispositions, and 
identifies psychological warfare as information operations specifically conducted by 
military forces to influence the behaviors of adversaries.52   
Nearly every classic military theorist has commented on psychological aspects of 
competition in some fashion, and countless scholars have sought to better capture the 
psychological component at all levels and forms of conflict. Andrew Mack contributed to 
renewed attention to psychology at the grand-strategic level through analysis of the paradox 
 
48 Van de Velde, “Instruments of Statecraft.”   
49 Nye. 2018. “China’s Soft and Sharp Power.” 
50 Carnes Lord, “The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy,” in Political Warfare and 
Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach,” ed. Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989). 
51 Ibid., 29–30. 
52 Robinson, Linda et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018) https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1772. 
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involving militarily superior states losing small, limited wars to weaker states. By assessing 
the failures of major military campaigns in limited conflicts such as Vietnam and the 
Algerian War, Mack demonstrates that militarily weaker states can leverage psychological 
power by leaning on asymmetric advantages in socio-political commitment and national 
will to overcome disadvantages in military capability.53  
In 2006, Edward Smith, a career naval officer, captured the role and strategies of 
psychological statecraft in the information age through extensive research on asymmetric 
warfare and effects-based operations. While Smith’s work is also born out of and intended 
to inform low-intensity military-centric conflict, his categories and descriptions of 
outcomes or “effects” of psychological versus physical means of shaping behavior (Figure 
6) still apply in the context of gray zone competition.
Figure 6. Kinds of Effects in Conflict54 
Smith describes effects-based operations as “coordinated sets of actions directed at
shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.” At the tactical 
level, a successful synchronization of effects emphasizes the destruction and shock of 
enemy forces, while emphasis at a geo-strategic level should be placed on psychological 
53 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations 27, no. 2 (1975): 175–200, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2009880. 
54 Edward Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and 
War (Fort Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2003). https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA457292.  
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attrition and passive foreclosure (Figure 7) with foreclosure defined as the curtailing of an 
opponent’s options.55 
Figure 7. Tactical, Military, and Geo-Strategic Level Balancing of Effects56 
As an example, China’s efforts to achieve control of territory in the SCS through 
legal maneuvering, occupation of territory, physical denial, and threat of recourse could be 
assessed according to the effects achieved at each level. In a geo-strategic context, CCP 
success would be assessed primarily by the degree to which other territorial claimants accept 
that their own escalated responses to area denial would result in either immediate or 
inevitable failure and the loss of any capabilities employed.57 Thus, Smith states that the
ultimate object of the psychological instrument is to break the will or otherwise shape the 
55 Ibid., 336–346. 
56 Ibid., 336–346. 
57 Ibid., 261. 
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behavior of resisters so that they no longer wish to continue a struggle which is an echo of 
military theory occasionally mused over but often underappreciated in practice.58 
Two other works on psychology, which concern the identification and evaluation of 
propaganda, provide insights for the evaluation and assessment of psychological statecraft 
at and below the national policy level of analysis. Edward Bernays, the “father of public 
relations” who helped engineer public opinion behind the 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état, 
provides basic characteristics of propaganda which helps to cut away some of the socially 
constructed misnomers more recently added to the term.59 Daniel Lerner, an American
scholar of psychological warfare and modernization theory, provides criteria for the 
evaluation of propaganda in world politics.60 Bernays explains that propaganda are ideas
disseminated on a large scale in a consistent and enduring effort to influences the relations 
of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.61 He also declares that propaganda “serves to
focus and realize the desires of the masses.” 62  Lerner contends that an evaluation of
propaganda requires clarity on five aspects: the nature of policy goals, the function of the 
propaganda in promoting these goals, the conditions essential for success, the possible 
effects that propaganda can achieve, and the types of evidence for estimating 
achievement. 63  Function deals with how the manipulation of beliefs and expectations
interacts with the functional application of other instruments such as diplomatic negotiation, 
economic bargaining, and military coercion. 64  Lerner’s conditions for success include
securing the attention of the audience, credence of the audiences, and ensuring the 
environment permits the modification of predispositions and expectations to new 
58 Ibid., 106. 
59 “Edward Bernays, ‘Father of Public Relations’ and Leader in Opinion Making, Dies at 103,” New 
York Times, March 10, 1995, 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/08/16/specials/bernays-obit.html. 
60 Daniel Lerner, Propaganda in War and Crisis; Materials for American Policy (New York: G. W. 
Stewart, 1951). 
61 Edward Bernays and Mark Crispin Miller, Propaganda (Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing, 2005), 11. 
62 Ibid., 12. 
63 Lerner, Propaganda in War and Crisis; Materials for American Policy, 344–351. 
64 Ibid., 346. 
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alternatives.65 Possible effects involve submission, subversion, cooperation, privatization 
and panic, and types of evidence include observable actions, audience accounts, and third-
party observer commentaries.66 
6. Modern Political Warfare 
After decades of disparate usage, RAND Corporation researchers recently distilled 
the concept of political warfare since Kennan into a more tightly defined version for 
application the modern gray zone competition. RAND describes modern political warfare 
as activities employed through a coordinated mix of traditional instruments of statecraft to 
affect the political composition or decision making of other governments. The researchers 
provide a helpful depiction of these instruments and activities working in concert as shown 
in Figure 8.67 
 
Figure 8. The Contours of Political Warfare68 
 
65 Ibid., 347. 
66 Ibid., 348–350. 
67 Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses. 
68 Ibid., 7. 
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To classify as political warfare, activities must support a deliberate policy choice to 
undermine a rival or achieve policy objectives. After examining each instrument and tactical 
activities through case study, RAND describes ten overarching characteristics of modern 
political warfare and makes eight recommendations for improving capabilities of the U.S. 
military and special operations forces (SOF) to combat modern political warfare.  
7. Government Sponsored Studies 
Every year since 2000, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provides a 
report to Congress on “military and security developments involving the People’s Republic 
of China.” 69  The report describes the DoD’s perspective on Chinese security strategy, 
capabilities, approach, and security cooperation with an outlook on future developments 
over the next 20 years. In the 2019 report, OSD views China’s strategic objective as securing 
“status as a great power and, ultimately emerging as the preeminent power in the Indo-
Pacific region.” 70 Further, the report claims that China’s leaders “use tactics short of armed 
conflict” and harness “an array of economic, foreign, policy, and security tools” to pursue 
military and strategic objectives. 71  Its authors speculate that China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) “will probably drive military overseas basing through a perceived need to 
provide security for [BRI] projects;” assert that the CCP “seeks to condition foreign and 
multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept China’s narrative 
surrounding its priorities;” and generalize that “China employs non-military tools 
coercively” to advance its interests.72 Finally, the report’s conclusion includes a “special 
topic” of discussion on Chinese influence operations focusing on the PLA’s Three Warfare 
Strategy. Comprised of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare, 
OSD views the Three Warfare Strategy as aimed at “establishing and maintaining power 
brokers within a foreign government to promote policies that will facilitate China’s rise.”73 
 
69 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:  Military and Security Developments Involving 
the People’s Republic of China 2019 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2, 2019). 
70 Ibid., 3. 
71 Ibid., 14. 
72 Ibid., 6. 
73 Ibid., 112. 
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Recognizing that stronger evidence for OSD’s views and claims likely exist in the classified 
version of the report or other unaccompanied documentation, several claims regarding 
China’s regional interests extend anecdotally from incidents within the disputed SCS or 
military operational concepts directed toward Taiwan. 
A second commissioned report, China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands: 
Implications for the United States, helps to explain U.S. security perspectives on China’s 
interests and strategies through a narrower look at Pacific Island Countries (PICs). With an 
heavier emphasis on particular events and activities as evidence, the report’s analysts 
contend that Beijing’s engagement with the Pacific Islands “is largely driven by interests in 
the following three areas: (1) promoting its diplomatic and strategic priorities; (2) reducing 
Taiwan’s international space; and (3) gaining access to raw materials and natural 
resources”. 74  Their study primarily examines Chinese statecraft at the regional level 
through its participation in regional organizations, high level visits, trade, and capital flows. 
The study demonstrates China’s involvement in the region as accelerating since the late 
1990s, particularly on economic fronts through aid and tourism.75 The reports assessments 
on trade, investment, development assistance, and tourism data place China well ahead of 
the United States in many areas of economic engagement within the Compact countries as 
well as the Northern Mariana Islands territory.76 
8. Institutional Research 
Given China’s growing global engagement, several institutes and thinktanks created 
dedicated teams to studying Chinese national power, foreign engagements, and influence. 
AEI and the Heritage Foundation, maintain a database of China’s global investments which 
they consider to be “the only comprehensive data set covering China’s global investment 
and construction.”77 The China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) project labels nearly 
 
74 Ethan Meick, Michelle Ker, and Han May Chan, “China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands: 
Implications for the United States.,”  (Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 2018). 
75 Meick, Ker, and Chan. 2018. 6. 
76 Meick, Ker, and Chan. 2018. 19. 
77 American Enterprise Institute, “China Global Investment Tracker.”  
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$700 billion of its nearly $2 trillion data set as “Belt and Road Initiative;” however, the data 
does not include any entries for Micronesian states and only a small handful of projects in 
Oceana outside of Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. This is not to say that 
Chinese projects in Micronesia do not exist. Since China is not a member country of the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and because CGIT 
only tracks global investments projects valued at $100 million or more, China’s capital 
flows to the Pacific Islands are under-researched by Washington policy thinktanks. 
Australia’s Lowy Institute maintains a similar database on Chinese capital flows, but Lowy 
uses a narrower scope in terms of activity type and project value. Lowy’s Pacific Aid Map 
identifies 265 Chinese projects in the region to the tune of $7 billion committed and $1.6 
billion spent since 2011.78 By Lowy’s estimates, China matches Australia in aid committed 
to the Pacific; however, Australia leads China in dollars actually spent by five to one.79 
AidData, a research lab at William and Mary college, gathers and assesses other data 
in addition to capital flows for aid which are particularly useful in the assessment of China’s 
public diplomacy activities. Two notable reports, Ties That Bind: Quantifying China’s 
public diplomacy and its “good neighbor” effect and Aid, China and Growth: Evidence from 
a New Global Development Finance Dataset, incorporate quantified measures of 
information and cultural exchanges along with China’s diplomatic and financial efforts.80 
In Ties That Bind researchers look at Chinese public diplomacy activities across 25 
countries in East Asia and the Pacific between 2000–2016 in order to examine how China 
packages messages for general audience and builds ties between its own citizens and leaders 
and those abroad. 81  After conducting quantitative assessments of proxy measures for 
cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, financial diplomacy, and elite-to-elite diplomacy 
(Figure 9), and conducting a qualitative assessment of informational diplomacy, researchers 
 
78 Lowy Institute. “Pacific Aid Map.” 
79 Julia Hollingsworth, “Why China is Challenging Australia for Influence over the Pacific Islands,” 
CNN, July 22, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/22/asia/china-australia-pacific-investment-intl-
hnk/index.html. 
80 Russel Custer, et.al., “Ties That Bind: Quantifying China’s Public Diplomacy and Its “Good 
Neighbor” Effect,” AID DATA, June 27, 2018, https://www.aiddata.org/publications/ties-that-bind. 
81 Ibid., 1. 
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found that China has tailored and targeted its public diplomacy efforts by country for various 
political and economic objectives.82  
 
Figure 9. Proxy Measures for Analysis of Chinese Public Diplomacy83 
Unfortunately, these assessments do not include all Micronesian states and 
territories. Even so, the measures, methods, data, and findings of the assessment help to 
provide a foundation on which to conduct subsequent assessments of psychological 
statecraft in the Pacific region.  
The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ China Power project hosts a 
range of data and expert analyses for developing a collective understanding of the 
international opportunities or challenges posed by China’s growth. China Power examines 
“five key areas of [Chinese] capabilities: military, economic, social, technology, 
international image and engagement” through the research of its fellows, forums, and 
debates between leading experts from both China and the United States. Three reports by 
CSIS fellows provide this research effort with important insights for the analysis of political 
 
82 Ibid., 1–6. 
83 Ibid., 7. 
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warfare via diplomatic and economic instruments. In 2016, Christopher Johnson provided a 
geo-economics focused analysis on China’s Belt and Road Initiative arguing that “although 
there certainly is an underlying geostrategic component to [BRI], this element is likely 
overstated by foreign observers, and especially in the U.S.”84 In 2018, Seth Jones wrote on 
a return of political warfare in international competition. Jones contends that much of 
today’s GPC between the U.S. and China “will likely be unconventional” and that focusing 
on preparing for conventional war “may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and 
capabilities.” 85 Lastly, Jonathan Hillman addresses a series of topics related to BRI to 
include: the extent that BRI projects follow norm market rules, how BRI affects China’s 
diplomatic reach, and the implications of BRI to the United States. First, Hillman evidences 
how Chinese projects are less open to local and international participation and transparency. 
Second, he demonstrates that China benefits politically through BRI projects with some 
countries but that broad foreign support for the BRI could decline as a result of overpromises 
and underperformance. Lastly, Hillman warns that greater success of BRI on China’s terms 
could revise trade and financial systems in a manner that dislocates the U.S. from its current, 
central position in the global economy.86  These featured studies published over the past few 
years demonstrate a narrowing of focus toward Chinese activities as tools of statecraft. They 
also show that uncertainty over the characterization of China’s economic activities in terms 
of legitimate competition versus coercion remains pervasive and contentious. 
Stanford University’s Hoover Institute and Asia Society, a global educational 
institution, recently collaborated on multi-year programs seeking greater consensus on 
characterizing China’s foreign policy behavior by focusing on the less tangible aspects of 
diplomacy, information, and influence leveraged by China within the U.S. The debates and 
forums hosted by the research centered around China’s approach toward shaping the 
 
84 Christopher Johnson, “President Xi’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative,’” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, March 28, 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/president-xi-jinping%E2%80%99s-
belt-and-road-initiative.. 
85 Seth Jones, “The Return of Political Warfare,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
February 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/return-political-warfare. 
86 Jonathan Hillman, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies,  January 25, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-five-
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organizational attitudes and behaviors of various public and private partners. The final 
report notes that a significant concern among collaborating experts is whether China’s elites 
are “willing and able to adjust economic and foreign policies so that they become more in 
line with the rules-based global order.” 87  The collection of these workgroup studies 
conclude that the CCP not only assertively seeks to “redefine China’s place in the world as 
a global player,” but also promotes a global development model “claimed to be a more 
efficient than liberal democracy.”88 These findings contribute to starker consensus among 
Asia Society contributors that “the United States and China are on a collision course” unless 
“more responsible statecraft” is employed to protect American interests and mitigate no-win 
outcomes.89 
9. Notable Individual Studies  
Darren Lim and Victor Ferguson, senior researchers in political economics at the 
Australian National University (ANU) School of Politics and International Relations, have 
each written and coauthored several works on Chinese foreign policy. In one article featured 
in ANU’s Centre on China in the World, Lim and Ferguson outline five pathways that China 
exercises power in its foreign engagements. The pathways described are attraction, 
coercion, persuasion, bargaining, and agenda setting.90 The authors provide examples for 
how China uniquely practices each method and describes how common conceptions of 
sharp power are explained by China’s exercising a combination of the five pathways 
specifically to co-opt support, deter criticism, and change narratives.  
Merriden Varrall of Australia’s Lowy Institute provides a notable contribution on 
Chinese influence through an assessment of the CCP’s use of specific narratives to justify 
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its foreign policy, maintain legitimacy, and interpret the behaviors of the international 
community toward China.91 According to Varrall, four key narratives regularly used by 
Chinese leaders provides a more nuanced understanding and a guide to Chinese behavior on 
the international stage. Most observers are aware of China’s leaders leveraging “the century 
of humiliation to describe how China’s central role in world affairs was weakened by 
Western incursions since the Opium Wars beginning in the 1840s.”92 A second narrative 
noted as, “cultural characteristics are inherent and unchanging,” describes a “belief that 
China has always been inherently peaceful and never aggressively expansionist.” Third, 
“history as destiny” explains China’s natural and rightful role as a global actor. The fourth 
narrative is “the idea that Chinese people and the state form a ‘family’” which requires filial 
piety and familial obligation. Varrell argues that China’s narratives are particularly 
powerful in explaining motivations in the East and South China Seas and that China’s 
creation of the AIIB and Belt and Road Initiatives “reflect the century of humiliation 
narrative and the idea of history as destiny.”93 
B. RESEARCH GAPS 
1. Effects-Based Analysis of Chinese Influence in the Pacific Islands  
Local observers contend that the significance of smaller Pacific Island nations 
continues to lack appreciation in the larger view of understanding and managing China’s 
rise.94 Indeed, far more observation and commentary exist on the importance of growing 
Chinese influence in the Pacific Islands than actual analysis of that influence. Experts have 
conducted helpful analyses of Chinese sharp power in Africa, Europe, South America, the 
United States, Australia and New Zealand, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, however, 
similar regional and national-level reports still do not exist for Pacific Islands presumably 
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due to a general lack of data to analyze.95 In 2018, The U.S. Congress increased reporting 
efforts on Compact states by mandating studies in the National Defense Authorization Act, 
but despite these government reports containing sections on China’s economic assistance 
practices, “information operations,” and “public diplomacy,” concerted efforts to describe 
influence, messaging, and psychological statecraft in conjunction with other instruments is 
lacking.96  
2. The Interests and Goals of Pacific Islanders  
In addition to an absence of data, understanding influence within the Pacific Islands 
is particularly difficult due to a lack of discussion and understanding of smaller nations’ 
willingness to bargain with China. Several reports recognize the vulnerabilities of small 
states to political influence stemming from weaknesses in economic development; however, 
most studies on Chinese influences focuses more on identifying bribery and coercion rather 
than looking at both positive and negative forms of economic statecraft as a described by 
David Baldwin. The rising influence of China creates new possibilities for Pacific Island 
nations beyond the terms they have previously negotiated for in recent decades.97 Despite 
the recognition of a changing geopolitical situation, views and interest of the smaller Pacific 
partners hardly receive adequate recognition in most reporting and discussion.  
C. CASE SELECTION 
Subsequent research in this work covers a range of comparative assessments on 
foreign engagement centering on three Pacific Island nations and one U.S. territory within 
Micronesia. The case study begins with an exploration of foreign engagement at the regional 
level; however, as analysis becomes more granular the research increases focus on specific 
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instruments of engagement and sectors of exchange that best defines China’s engagement 
within each country. The initial indication, through cursory study, is that FSM is the most 
politically tenuous of the three Micronesian nations and best supports deeper analysis on 
China’s political warfare. FSM is the only Micronesian nations to diplomatically recognize 
the PRC while Palau and the Marshall Islands still recognize Taiwan. It would be expected 
that through comparison China has developed more and stronger mechanisms for attractive 
and persuasive influence within FSM while relying on sharper forms of engagement with 
Palau and RMI to gain and leverage influence for political objectives. FSM is also not only 
regarded as the least assured nation in reaffirming the terms of its COFA with the U.S., but 
its province of Chuuk is also approaching the end of a five-year legal process to hold a 
referendum for national independence in March of 2020.98 
These Micronesian nations were selected for analysis in the context of GPC for 
several practical reasons related to their relative size, isolation, and importance to the U.S. 
As stated previously, institutional research and data on all the Pacific Islands compared to 
much of the world is lacking, but the unique diplomatic relationships that Compact states 
share with the U.S. provides additional sources of information via the various oversight 
reporting of government agencies. Also, each country’s relatively small populations, land 
areas, and political structures, make efforts to inventory foreign interactions more 
manageable where current information and data requires augmenting. Finally, given their 
history, Micronesian governance and bureaucratic systems generally mirror those of U.S. 
states at national and state/provincial levels. This last point makes assessment of changes to 
political composition or decision making a more straightforward process than alternative 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. EXAMINATION OF THE CASES 
This assessment takes an ends, means, ways approach to understanding the CCP’s 
strategy for gaining position and influence relative to the U.S. in Micronesia. 99  This 
approach requires that ends, means, and ways are in balance and if they are not, the strategy 
has high risk of failure. 100  The Micronesia case study is first examined through a 
chronological study of major regional developments over three decades in order to 
characterize the nature of changing Chinese presence relative to other key international 
actors. This initial assessment uses government policies and open source reporting to 
develop a full listing of the political, economic, and security goals (the ends) of each major 
actor operating near, with, and through Micronesia with an emphasis on identifying China’s 
changing interests and policy goals relative to other actors. After assessing the range of 
plausible Chinese interests and motivations, the study then collects and collates available 
datasets pertaining to Chinese diplomatic, economic, and information-related activities (the 
means) in each in each of the three independent Micronesian nations and the U.S. territory 
of CNMI. Once gathered, analysis is conducted over a series of steps. First, assessment of 
available data compares China’s employment of statecraft instruments (the ways) and 
identifies activities that specify or demonstrate reasonable connections with Chinese 
interests. Next, the research expands available data by using open source internet and media-
based research to identify additional relevant engagements as well as information-based 
activities associated with diplomatic or economic activities. The final phases of analysis 
involve a targeted assessment of specific activities for indicators of psychological statecraft, 
sharp power, and political warfare followed by a testing of alternative hypotheses for 
explaining efforts to influence.  
 
99 Harry Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy,” Chapter 8 in Guide to National Policy and Strategy, 
2nd Edition, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2006.  
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B. EXAMINING INTERESTS AND MOTIVATIONS 
The first step for assessing U.S.-China competition in Micronesia is determining 
plausible interests and motivations behind sponsored activities in the region. Chapter IV 
uses primary and secondary source research of key actors’ policies and regional engagement 
at the macro-level to capture specified or well documented interests in a broad scope which 
allows us to assess the 2nd and 4th research hypotheses and make initial findings toward 
testing H3.  
H2: China’s political objectives in the central Pacific grow more assertive and antithetical 
to American interests as countries become more dependent on Chinese trade and capital 
flows. 
H4: China’s foreign engagement and volume of public diplomacy within Micronesia 
increases during periods of political dispute with the United States.  
H3: China’s economic engagements in Micronesia have limited potential for economic 
return, but notable capacity for political opportunity and leverage.  
After outlining the interests of the U.S., Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Chapter IV provides a more thorough analysis of the national interests of Pacific 
Islands themselves and of China. Analysis of Micronesian nations focus on the key interests 
in each of the past three decades and the nation’s priorities for future engagement with 
foreign powers. Analysis of China looks at changes in diplomatic and economic engagement 
in absolute terms and the degree to which China’s engagement matches the demand signals 
of Micronesian policy makers. Diplomatic engagement focuses on official engagements 
between senior leadership; economic engagement assesses macro-level data and trends for 
national trade, capital flows, acquisitions and shareholding; Chapter IV concludes with a 
comparison of foreign diplomatic and economic engagement in Micronesia in relative terms 
and an overall assessment of China’s interests and opportunities for expanded presence in 
the region. 
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C. EXAMINING CHINESE STATECRAFT 
The second step of analysis focuses on cataloging specifically where, how, and with 
who China has previously employed and continues to employ instruments of statecraft 
within Micronesia. Chapter V begins with a collation and assessment of data built and 
maintained by think tanks (i.e., Pacific Aid Map—Lowy Institute), educational institutions 
(i.e., Aid Data—College of William and Mary), and intergovernmental agencies (i.e., 
GovData360—World Bank) on each of the three Micronesian nations and CNMI. Each 
activity or event captured is characterized by the instruments of statecraft functionally 
employed, a categorical activity of that instrument, and categories of local impact or efforts 
supported, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Excerpt of Chinese Engagement with the Federated States of Micronesia 101 






1 2009 Bridge Project Feasibility Study   
Sichuan Road and Bridge Cooperation 
Okat Bridge, Kosrae  





Bi-lateral Agreement for funding and 
construction of bridge in Kosrae 
Kosrae / Okat Bridge 
Total cost: 13 million USD. 
China provides 60 million RMB in grants. 
Unspecified Chinese Funding Agency 
2014. Approved by FSM 
2014. Sichuan Road & Bridge 
Construction 
begins project 
2016 Project Complete. 
2015. China railway 17th Bureau Group 
implement mid-term quality inspection. 
Assessment concludes that the project 
meets acceptance criteria. 
Source: AidData Global Chinese Official 
Finance Dataset 
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36 
After collating diplomatic, economic, and cultural exchange data further opensource 
research is conducted to capture consequential public diplomacy engagements involving 
non-government associated business or social elites out of the PRC and “information 
diplomacy” associated with higher profile Chinese activities. Our expanded data set is then 
used to reassess H2, H3, and H4 and highlight relevant information to assist in subsequent 
testing of H1, H5, and H6.  
H1: The CCP leverages coercive diplomatic, economic, and psychological statecraft in 
concerted campaigns to weaken Compacts of Free Association agreements between the 
United States, Palau, FSM, and RMI. 
H5: China increases tangible support to local actors who take outspoken positions against 
U.S. policies. 
H6: The CCP utilizes misinformation to obscure its strategic intentions and activities in 
Micronesia. 
Chapter V concludes with an assessment of China’s use of statecraft in seeking 
leverage and influence to further policy objectives. Diplomatic strategies are assessed in 
terms of Lim and Ferguson’s pathways to power in Chinese foreign policy.102  Economic 
strategies are assessed using Wigell’s framework of geo-economics and the notion that a 







102 Lim and Ferguson, “Power in Chinese Foreign Policy,” 57–60. 
103 Wigell, “Conceptualizing Regional Powers’ Geo-Economic Strategies,” 142–149.  
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Table 2. Theoretical Perspectives of Geo-economic Strategy104  




Foreign assistance through 
established IDBs and IGOs: Local 
development maintains priority 
(Untied Aid through PIF) 




statecraft: Mutual returns on 
economic investment over time 





statecraft: Unilateral returns on 
Investment 




statecraft: Coercion, Imposition, 
Bribery  
(Creation of AIIB, NDB) 
Null: Geopolitical Goals Political returns: Allies and support  
(Tied Aid, Recognition of One 
China Policy) 
Null: Geostrategic Goals 





Psychological strategies are assessed through Daniel Lerner’s criteria for the 
evaluation of propaganda and Edward Smith’s effects-based outcomes asymmetric 
competition. The study also assesses psychological statecraft in terms of whether messaging 
constitutes propaganda (predisposition shaping) or information warfare (behavior shaping). 
Finally, a qualitative assessment is conducted to discern the degree that respective strategies 
support broader strategic objectives and how China’s respective activities and strategies 
have changed over time. 
 
104 Derived from Wigell, 2016. 
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D. ASSESSING POLITICAL WARFARE 
The final assessment of the case study is a deductive analysis on the degree that 
China’s state-sponsored activities constitute successful political warfare. Chapter V focuses 
on local-level analysis for the case study by taking a more granular look into specific projects 
or programs through which China may be seeking change to the composition of local 
politics, influence foreign decision-making. By combining Lim and Ferguson’s foreign 
policy strategies with political science concepts of state power and RANDs definition of 
political warfare, this study establishes thresholds for the characterization of Chinese 
statecraft as indicated in Figure 10.  
Tactical Activity (Employment of Power) 
Routine Diplomacy (Attraction—Soft) 
Public Diplomacy (Persuasion—Smart)  
Routine Trade and Investment (Bargaining—Smart) 
Threshold for Political Warfare 
Indicators: (Agenda Setting, Coercion—Sharp) 
Use of statecraft to affect political composition or decision making 
Deliberate policy choice to undermine a rival 
Deliberate policy choice to achieve other explicitly political objectives 
Example Set of Activities 
Propaganda   
Aid to Political Parties   
Economic Subversion   
Aid to Resistance Groups   
Conditional Military Aid   
Psychological Warfare    
Other    
Threshold for War 
Indicator: Violence (Hard Power) 
Conventional Military Operations 
Figure 10. Theoretical Threshold for Political Warfare105 
 
105 Lim and Ferguson, “Power in Chinese Foreign Policy.” 
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Additionally, where the three threshold indicators may be plausible but not explicitly 
observed, the research adapts and uses five of the ten RAND characteristics of modern 
political warfare as an alternative method for determining whether CCP activities reflect a 
political warfare strategy: 
Do events or activities seek or provide credibility and leverage to the CCP?  
Are there unattributable actors or means involved with the activity/engagement? 
Is the event or activity heavy laden with behavior-shaping messaging?  
Are there indicators of economic leverage via coercion, bribery, or imposition? 
Do events or activities exploit ethnic or other socio-cultural seams?  
In order to conduct a comparative assessment, Chapter V will select and analyze a 
project or program that the Chinese government sponsors or supports in each of the three 
Compact states. Chapter V also conducts a mini case study on the province of Chuuk in order 
to find and examine any indicators that China has enmeshed itself in the Chuukese 
referendum for succession from FSM.  
E. ASSESSING IMPLICATION AND IMPACT 
The final chapter of this research assesses the extent that China’s activities at the 
local level in Micronesia affirm or refute claims that China engages in efforts to displace 
American power, influence, and values. The assessment seeks to determine whether and 
how China leverages local and third-party actors to influence the collective defense policies 
of the United States. Finally, the assessment will be compared across competing hypotheses 
on Chinese foreign relations based upon theoretical perspectives provided by Aaron 
Friedberg:  
 
F. ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES  
1) Growing Security Dilemma (Realist Pessimist). As Chinese presence increases, 
China increases leverage against local political composition or decision making 
to undermine U.S. interests and influence  
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2) Muted Security Dilemma (Realist Optimist). China’s presence and engagement 
continually increase; however, attempts to affect local political affairs are left 
wanting due to a lack of credibility, leverage, or other resistance factors. 
 
3) Perils of Authoritarian Transition (Liberal Pessimist). Micronesian states 
develop mutually beneficial economic interdependency and institutional 
integration with China; however, active authoritarianism creates negative 
pressures on liberal norms and creates structural instability. 
 
4) Security and Liberalization (Liberal Optimist). Increased economic 
engagement and institutional integration pressures the CCP to liberalize 
Chinese engagement—increasing private sector engagement and increasing 
transparency and accountability of state activities. Chinese programs contribute 
to greater political, economic, and ecological security for Micronesians. 
 
5) Softening (Constructivist Optimist). Institutional integration pulls the United 
States, China, and regional actors into new, more cooperative arrangements 
within Micronesia. 
 
6) Hardening (Constructivist Pessimist). Institutional arrangements falter and fail 
under the pressures of increasingly rigid engagements between members.    
 
The study will conclude with a summary of findings, policy recommendations to 
mitigate risks to established security arrangements in the Central Pacific, and 











IV. MOTIVATIONS AND INTERESTS IN OCEANIA
The Pacific Island regions of Oceania consists of 14 independent nations and several 
territories situated throughout the three geographic subregions of Polynesia, Melanesia, and 
Micronesia (Figure 11). Polynesia stretches from the Hawaiian Islands to New Zealand and 
contains the nations of Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, Niue, and the Cook Islands. Melanesia 
includes Papua New Guinea (PNG), Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Micronesia 
consists of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (RMI), Kiribati, and Nauru. Major territories in the region include French Polynesia 
and New Caledonia as well as the U.S. territories of the Northern Mariana Islands (CMNI) 
and Guam. 
Figure 11. Sub Regions Within Oceania106 
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) span across vast ocean territories which creates 
substantial challenges for their populations and governments. Geographic dispersion, 
limited resources, environmental fragility, and remoteness all place downward pressures on 
106 Source: Cruickshanks. “Map of Oceania,” Wikimedia Commons: CC-BY-SA-3.0. 
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economic activity as well as human security, and many PICs have suffered persistently low 
growths or declines in real per capita incomes over the past 25 years.107 When setting aside
PNG, the collective GDP of island nations amounted to roughly $10 billion USD in 2018—
up from $1 billion in 1975.108 The total population of these states rose from 1.3 million then
to roughly 2.5 million now, making the region’s current gross national income roughly 
$4,140 per individual.109 Five Pacific Island nations rank in the global top 20 at risk to
natural disaster, and the UN recognizes four PICs on its list of Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs).110   
Alternatively, vast ocean territories create unique opportunities for the islands. 
Expansive economic exclusion zones (EEZs), geographic positioning along maritime 
corridors, and equal political standing in international fora provide small island nations 
outsized influence. Regional efforts for economic advancement over the next 25 years focus 
towards improved local management of fisheries, expanding tourism, deep sea mining, and 
improving labor mobility.111 Given the importance of the fisheries within their EEZs and
acute vulnerabilities to natural disaster, PICs wield a disproportionate amount of influence 
on matters related to global fishing and climate change. 112  The Pacific Islands Forum
(PIF)—comprised of the 14 aforementioned PICs, two French territories, Australia, and 
New Zealand—serves as the region’s premier political and economic policy organization 
for managing these and other key strategic issues.113 
107 “Pacific Possible: Long-term Economic Opportunities and Challenges for Pacific Island 
Countries” (working paper, World Bank, 2017), XIV, https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-
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109 “Pacific Islands Overview,” World Bank, September 26, 2019.” 
110 “UN List of Least Developed Countries,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTD), accessed https://unctad.org/en/Pages/ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-
Least-Developed-Countries.aspx. 
111 World Bank, “Pacific Possible: Long-term Economic Opportunities and Challenges for Pacific 
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112 Ethan Meick, “China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Implications for the United States.” 
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In terms of political influence, each Island nation engages its own unique set of 
“associated” bilateral partners, regional associations, and global activist networks. New 
Zealand traditionally acts as the primary partner to Polynesian communities, except for 
American Samoa and French Polynesia. Australia plays a heavy role throughout the region 
with focused engagement in Melanesia. France contributes significantly to its administered 
territories of French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna. Japan, Taiwan, and 
China have each contributed significantly to the economic development of select partners; 
however, PICs still divide amongst four prominent spheres of influence: United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, and France. Given its combination of longstanding Compact 
agreements and territories, he U.S. sphere of influence predominantly lies within 
Micronesia.114  
A. U.S. INTERESTS  
The current administration stresses four “vital” interests of the United States at a 
global level—protect the homeland, promote American prosperity, preserve peace through 
strength, and advance American influence.115 Rhetorically, these interests deviate from the 
previous “enduring interests” of promoting security, prosperity, values, and a rule-based 
international order; however, while President Donald Trump maintains that current 
American interests are “guided by a return to principled realism,” the implementation and 
execution of foreign engagement continues to blend much of the same tools and principles 
developed through the eras of containment, engagement and enlargement, and collective 
security. 116  The U.S. Department of State (USDOS) asserts that “the resilience of our 
partners and allies to deter aggression, coercion and malign influence” is fundamental to 
protecting security; that “healthy, educated and productive populations” within partner 
nations promotes American prosperity and sustained economic growth; and that 
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Partnership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2019, https://csis-
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transitioning nations “from assistance recipients to enduring partners” advances American 
leadership. 117  Similarly, the Defense Department conveys in its strategic defense 
framework that a robust network of allies and partners is as important to achieving military 
objectives as building lethal capability in the era of great power competition.118  
1. Regional Interests  
The United States considers itself a dedicated security provider throughout the Pacific. 
Since 1951, Washington has maintained collective defense arrangements with Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, the Republic of Korea and guarantees the 
defense of numerous Pacific Island nations and territories.119 The U.S. government also 
signed a defense treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1955, but the Carter 
administration nullified the agreement in 1979 upon establishing diplomatic relations with 
Beijing. Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Washington extended “defense 
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense.”120 By mandating a determination of Taiwan’s defense 
by military authorities, the President, and the Congress, the TRA provides the United States  
with strategic ambiguity designed to both dissuade Taiwan from unilaterally declaring 
independence and dissuade the PRC from unilaterally unifying the two entities.121 Since 
2016, Washington has reinforced defacto support to Taiwan by formalizing its “six 
assurances” policy, increasing diplomatic engagement, and providing record military arms 
sales.122 In addition to support to partners and allies, Washington also maintains forward 
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presence and force projection in the region to facilitate its deter, secure, and defend functions 
for national defense. 
U.S. economic interests within Oceania have been modest relative to other regions. 
In 2018, U.S. exports to the region totaled $30.4 billion with imports totaling $14.8 billion; 
however, when removing Australia and New Zealand, these figures plummet to roughly $1 
billion and $470 Million respectively.123 Samples of trade data in Table 3 show the changes 
in total value for U.S. imports and exports with Pacific Island nations and demonstrates both 
the preponderance of U.S. exchanges in with Fiji, PNG, and the French territories as well as 
the considerable rise in total regional trade over the past decade.  
Table 3. Sample of U.S. Imports and Exports with Pacific Island States and 
Territories: 1994, 2006, and 2018 (USD Million)124  
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U.S. goods exported to the region vary considerably by type and location, while 
goods received generally reflect greater consistency and allow for the development of 
specialized economic relations with several nations. Export growth centers around aircraft 
and aircraft parts to both French Polynesia and Fiji; shipping containers and crude oil to the 
RMI; and industrial equipment to PNG.125 Water and caviar from Fiji are currently the 
largest and fastest growing imports which represent nearly a quarter value of all PIC-derived 
goods by value.126 Other major imports include coffee and cocoa from Papua New Guinea 
and nickel from New Caledonia. Outside of these specialties, a significant portion of 
imported goods consist of fish and fish products, local produce and flora, and local artwork 
or collectibles.  
According to USDOS, the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty commonly called the South 
Pacific Tuna Treaty (SPTT), serves “as a cornerstone for cooperation.” between the United 
States and Pacific Island signatories.127 Dating back to 1988, the SPTT establishes terms of 
access for U.S. fishing vessels within Pacific Island EEZs. Given that U.S. vessels catch 
over 10% of tuna harvested from the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), Pew 
estimates dock value of WCPO tuna at $6.5 billion, and end-product sales value between 
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end-sales ranging between $3 billion and $4 billion annually.128 The SPTT is also tied to a 
“related agreement” whereby the U.S. government provides $21 million in economic 
overseas development assistance (ODA) to multinational fisheries management 
organizations which provide a major source of income to smaller island nations.129 
Beyond security and financial interests, the United States also maintains regional 
development interests. USDOS partners with the Pacific community to tackle challenges to 
regional stability, sustainable growth, and environmental security.130 U.S. development 
efforts dipped in the 1990s after the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) ended its mission in the Pacific and returned once USAID opened its new regional 
office in PNG.131 Depending on sources or methods used, the United States ranks either 
second or third largest contributor of ODA to the region. Figure 12, and associated data 
maintained by USAID, show that between 2006 and 2018 U.S. foreign aid to the region 
surpassed $2.5 billion with most of the funding going to U.S. Compact nations.  
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Note: 2018 Data incomplete according to source. 
Figure 12. U.S. Foreign Aid 2001–2018.132  
Despite variations in estimates, most contemporary assessments contend that U.S. 
assistance to Pacific Islands over the past several decades has been insufficient or even 
negligent, which has prompted Washington to amplify its commitments toward regional 
development and stability. In 2016, Representative Matt Salmon, then-Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, advocated increased attention to PICs due to their 
roles “in regional security as participants in international organizations and as the neighbors 
to our own U.S. territories.”133 Official messaging in 2018 publicized U.S. commits at “more 
than $350 million to the Pacific Islands annually via projects, assistance, and operations.”134 In 
August 2019, Secretary of the Interior David Bernhardt announced $36.5 million more in ODA 
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to support climate change initiatives, security cooperation, and public diplomacy programs.135 
In September 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced an additional $65 million in 
new assistance for governance, disaster resilience, maritime security, and the development of 
information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure.136  
2. U.S. Interests in Micronesia 
Post-WWII, the United Nations Trusteeship Council assigned administrative control 
of the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas Island chains to the United States as a strategic-area 
trusteeship designated as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). From the 1970s 
through 1980s, the administered territories transitioned their governance systems into their 
current respective arrangements. Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands became U.S. 
territories. Four of the six administrative districts—Kosrae, Pohnpei, Truk (now Chuuk), 
and Yap—established the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The Marshall Islands 
became the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) and Palau formed the Republic of Palau 
(ROP).137 Following examples set by the Cook Islands and Niue, who each declared their 
own independent statehood in free association with New Zealand, FSM, RMI, and ROP 
negotiated for and ratified their declarations of independence in association with the United 
States. This designation bound the parties to special political affiliations, economic 
development arrangements, and security guarantees all integrated into two comprehensive 
accords.138 RMI and FSM signed the first joint Compact with U.S. representatives in 1982 
which the U.S. Congress ratified as The Compact of Free Association Act of 1985. This 
original COFA obligated U.S. funding and oversight for economic development through 
2002, at which point the parties completed negotiations for an amendment to extend U.S. 
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support under slightly different terms to 2023.139 Palau entered into its own Compact which 
took effect in 1994, and also allocated 15 years of grant-based funding for development 
assistance.140   
The Compact of Free Associations Amendments Act of 2003 breaks down into the 
same four title parts as the original: “Governmental Relations,” “Economic Relations,” 
“Security and Defense Relations”; and “General Provisions.” Government relations 
includes permissions for citizens to “lawfully engage in occupations, and establish residence 
as a nonimmigrant in the United States and its Territories.”141 Title 1 also requires  each 
party to “prevent or eliminate damage to the environment” and allows Compact states to 
bring certain United States actions under legal review as an enforcement mechanism for 
ensuring environmental protection.” 142  Under Title 2 the United States is obligated to 
provide grant-based development assistance for education, healthcare, private sector 
development, the environment, and public sector capacity building. Over the course of 20 
years, an increasing portion of assistance funding is removed from sector-based grants and 
allocated into trust funds intended to provide for continued economic security upon the 
expiration of appropriated funding in 2024. 143  Figure 13 demonstrates the gradual 
decrement of Compact grant funding from sector-grant payments into RMI’s Compact Trust 
Fund (RMI-CTF) over time. The figure shows total annual contributions of roughly $60 
million per year to RMI; similar payment arrangements for FSM, not shown, total around 
$93 million per year in grants and trust fund contributions. Title Two establishes 
requirements for U.S. oversight of grant allocations via the U.S. Department of the Interior 
(USDOI) and allows for any funding not allocated each year to carry forward for use in 
subsequent budget cycles. Title Three gives the United States exclusive authority to both 
establish military facilities and foreclose access to third party countries “for military 
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purposes.”144 It also continues authorized volunteer service of Compact nation citizens in 
the U.S. armed forces as well as prevents the testing, disposing and discharging of 
radioactive, chemical, or biological materials that would be hazardous to public health or 
safety. 
 
Figure 13. Amended Compact Funding for Development Grants and Trust Fund 
Contributions to RMI (2004–2007 not shown).145  
Early in the Cold War, U.S. territory in Micronesia became “the site of the largest 
nuclear weapons testing program in the world.” 146  Since then the United States has 
expanded air, surface, and subsurface training capability in CMNI and regularly conducts 
intercontinental ballistic missile testing and space surveillance operations from the Ronald 
Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site in the Marshall Islands.147 Radar systems on 
Palau also help to monitor missile tests from actors such as North Korea, and the U.S. 
military regards its assets and basing in Guam as a strategically vital due to its position as 
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“the westernmost territory of the United States.”148 Guam hosts active Missile Defense 
capability, continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and bomber 
presence as well as significant ammunition and fuel storage for the region. Beginning in 
2020, a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of 5,000 U.S. Marines will forward 
position in Guam, and INDOPACOM continues to expand its “ready joint forces” and 
“multilateral training” in CMNI.  
B. PACIFIC ISLAND NATIONS—REGIONAL INTERESTS 
Leaders in the Pacific Islands emphasize that “escalating climate change related 
impacts, coupled with the intensification of geostrategic competition” exacerbates the 
region’s vulnerabilities.149 Every year, members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) meet to 
coordinate regional efforts pertaining to political, economic, and security matters and set 
agendas for broader international engagement. Since its inception, the PIF has sought 
increased regionalization of governance and collective action. Consequently, 
Intergovernmental ministries and frameworks have assumed greater roles in managing core 
interests such as fishing (Pacific Islands Forum Fishing Agency), energy (Pacific Power 
Association), development (Pacific Islands Development Program), science and 
technological assistance (Secretariat of the Pacific Community) and tourism (South Pacific 
Tourism Organization). In 1989, the PIF annual meeting has expanded to facilitate dialogue 
with “post-forum” observers among whom include the United States, China, Japan, South 
Korea, France, the Philippines and a dozen other countries.150 Australia and New Zealand, 
as founding members of the PIF, contribute substantially to supporting and furthering 
regional initiatives particularly in the areas of regional and maritime security, economic and 
technical assistance to development, and regional trade arrangements.  
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1. Regional Security Interests 
Small Pacific Island nations possess fundamentally different concepts of national 
security than major powers. Economic security, human security, and environmental security 
issues far outstrip local focus on national defense, and islanders regard climate change and 
sea level rise as “the greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and well-being of the peoples 
of the Pacific.”151 PIF member states recently formalized this long expressed concept in 
2018 through signing of the Boe Declaration on Regional Security. PIF members also 
recognize maritime security as “a key issue for the development and security of the 
region.”152 For smaller island nations, maritime security is not so much a territorial defense 
issue as an economic security issue tied to preventing the illegal, unprotected, and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing that threatens these countries’ most renewable resources. 
Australia has committed several billion dollars in recent years towards this priority effort 
through the expansion of regional surface patrol capacities, aerial surveillance, and the 
establishment of a Pacific Fusion Center for maritime management. 153  PIF members 
maintain that cornerstone priorities in the region include the sustainment of ocean resources; 
managing climate change and disaster resilience; strengthening institutional arrangements; 
connecting the “Blue Pacific Continent” through air, sea, and ICTs; improving public health 
conditions; and managing nuclear and radiological contamination. 154  Every year since 
1995, PIF communique have included calls for the United States to address health 
consequences related to previous nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands.155 
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2. Regional Economic Interests 
The Pacific Islands region leans heavily on foreign support and after decades of 
assistance and low economic growth, many PICs are expanding their search for methods and 
partnerships that will assist in mobilizing their niche economies for sustainable economic 
self-reliance. Remittances historically contribute 6 to 10 percent of annual GDP for most 
small island nations, while development assistance contributes anywhere from 8 percent—
in the case of Palau—to upwards of percent for several other small states.156 According to 
OECD data, the leading donors of ODA to the region in 2017 were: Australia ($814 million), 
Japan ($230 million), New Zealand ($225 million), the United States ($157million), and 
France, ($102 million).157 The Lowy Institute also captures significant contributions from 
the Asia Development Bank ($187 million), China, ($171 million), the World Bank ($115 
million), and United Nations ($112 million).158 In total, development assistance to the 
region exceeded $2.4 billion in 2017.159 UN projections indicate negative economic growth 
per capita for several Polynesian and Micronesian countries over the next 20 years; however, 
PIF members demonstrate optimistic inclinations towards assessments by the World Bank’s 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).160 
Given states’ individual impediments to economic growth and high costs of 
transaction, the Pacific community views multilateral collective action as the best approach 
towards economic growth and stability. 161  IBRD assessments suggest that further 
regionalization in fisheries, tourism, labor mobility policies, and ICT expansion will provide 
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significantly more economic opportunities and stability in the coming decades.162 Recent 
Pacific Forum agendas closely echo the priorities, challenges, and possibilities reflected in 
these assessments 163 Some of the optimism that PIF members have towards collective 
action and the efforts their intergovernmental agencies come from tangible results delivered 
in recent years. Multilateral fisheries management unlocked $250 million per year in public 
revenues by collectivizing fees imposed on foreign-registered fishing vessels. 164  This 
“Vessel Day Scheme” (VDS) has become a significant source of government funding for 
several small-economy nations, and analysts project that regional VDS revenues could 
double in value again by 2040 “without an increase in catch levels or threats to the 
sustainability of the fisheries stock.”165 Figure 14 shows the contribution of access fees as 
a percentage of total GDP for select states and demonstrates the rise in contributions 
following the implementation of VDS in 2011.  
 
Figure 14. Contribution of tuna access fees from foreign fleets to select PICs as a 
proportion of GDP (2010–2014)166 
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Regionalization, technical assistance programs, and IGO assessments appear to 
have strong impacts on shaping the strategic thinking, motivations, and mobilization within 
the Pacific Islands community. The World Bank assesses that regional policies in fisheries 
management could feasibly boost the smaller economies of Tuvalu, Kiribati and FSM by 
generating over $300 million in new revenues and 15,000 jobs for local islanders. 167 
Tourism could likewise contribute an additional $1.8 billion in revenues and up to 128,000 
jobs for six PICs, while the larger economies of Fiji, PNG, and the Solomon Islands could 
benefit through efficiencies created by the development of ICT capacities.168 Figure 15 
shows the World Bank’s estimates for what each PIC stands to gain through further 
development in regional fishing, tourism, labor mobility, and ICT expansion over the next 
two decades. According to analysts at the IBRD, the Marshall Islands is the only country 
that lacks “any significant growth opportunities.”169 
 
Figure 15. International Bank for Reconstruction Efforts assessment of income 
growth potential for Pacific Islands Countries.170 
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3. Marshallese Interests 
The Republic of the Marshall Islands seeks to continue building strategic 
partnerships centered around advancing global efforts on environmental protection, 
mitigating its own long-term environmental security threats, and looking for opportunities 
to achieve greater self-sufficiency. In three decades, slow economic growth in the RMI has 
helped the nation shed some reliance on foreign assistance and borrowing, but ODA 
continues to prop up limited domestic capacities. In past decades, much of RMI’s human 
security and financial stability has rested heavily on foundations made and maintained by a 
handful of foreign partners. The atoll nation of 58,000 residents hosts three embassies in 
Majuro which represent the United States, Japan, and ROC Taiwan, while RMI itself staff’s 
embassies in Washington, Tokyo, Taipei and Suva as well as consulates in Manila, Tel Aviv, 
Honolulu, and Springdale Arkansas. The vast majority of RMI’s residents live and work in 
the two local population centers of Majuro and Ebaye while 30,000 additional Marshallese 
have emigrated in recent decades to work and reside in communities concentrated within 
Arkansas, Hawaii, Oklahoma, California, and 14 other western and southern U.S. states. 
The U.S. military base on Kwajalein atoll near Ebaye employs around 15 percent of the 
country’s entire private sector workforce, and U.S. payments for occupation contributes 
roughly 10% of GDP. Table 4 provides key economic indicators and statistics 
demonstrating the contribution of remittances, ODA, and FDI relative to total economic 
production as reported by the OECD. Due to conditions associated with U.S. grant funding, 
the World Bank and OECD statistics do not include some elements of funding provided by 
U.S. Compact grants.  
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Table 4. Economic Indicators for the RMI 1990–2018 USD (Million) 
 
 
Aside from losses in human capital from high emigration, RMI’s government faces 
challenges involving a narrow economic base, limited natural resources, limited access to 
international markets, and high costs of doing business along with perpetual threats and 
costs associated with climate change. 171  These challenges have contributed to modest 
economic growth, and real wages have steadily declined around 2 percent annually since 
2003.172 Domestic unemployment within the RMI persists at levels at or above 30 percent, 
so remittances, subsistence farming, and fishing each contribute significantly to local 
livelihoods. The Marshallese view climate change as an even more pressing issue than the 
stagnant economy. In coming decades, sea level rise is expected to inundate several atolls, 
which has driven the Marshallese to become prominent advocates for global climate change 
management and environmental protection. 
RMI’s Economic Policy, Planning, and Statistics Office (EPPSO) acts as the 
nation’s chief planning body for tackling economic security issues through strategy 
development and planning. EPPSO coordinates efforts across RMI’s government and 
partners in support of five core strategic “sectors” consisting of “Social Development”; 
“Environment,” “Climate Change and Resiliency”; “Infrastructure Development”; 
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“Sustainable Economic Development”; and “Good Governance”. 173  Within this 
framework, EPPSO prioritizes 10 foundational goals which include: “1—Operating in an 
interdependent world” which focuses on maximizing international partnerships; “2—
Enhanced Socio-Economic Self Reliance;” and “3—An Educated People.”174 RMI has 
made some small steps towards its goals of education, economic self-reliance, and collective 
action in support of environmental security, but the country still requires significant external 
support for development. 
United States policy and economic support features prominently in the RMI’s 
support network and timeline. The Marshallese received roughly $1 billion in economic 
assistance from the United States between 1986 and 2001 under the original COFA and 
continues to receive injections of roughly $60 million annually through the amended 
Compact which came into effect in 2004.175 The amended Compact earmarks roughly $30 
million a year for education, health, private sector development, and governance capacity 
building. It also provides $20 million in annual lease payments to the Ebeye and Kwajalein 
communities and contributes annual remainders to the RMI Compact Trust Fund (RMI-
CTF). 176  Budget analysts estimate that RMI-CTF growth will achieve benchmarks 
sufficient enough to allow a smooth transition from grant reliance to sustained interest 
payments by 2024. This sustainability of trust fund payments significantly contributes to the 
government’s goal of economic self-sufficiency, but RMI still struggles with a lack of 
opportunities for real economic growth. Figure 16 shows RMI’s top five domestic revenue 
sources and demonstrates the country’s substantial reliance on U.S. grant funding which 
provided approximately 50 percent of the government budget in 2014 and forecasts around 
48 percent going forward. RMI-CTF disbursements will replace the equivalent of “Compact 
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Sector Grants,” and “Compacts Rents will continue, but analysts assess the status of funding 
for “Other U.S. Federal Grants” beyond 2024 as “uncertain.”177   
 
Figure 16. Recent and Projected U.S. Compact Funding Compared to Other 
Sources of RMI Government Revenues (2016-2020).178 
During the amended Compact period beginning in 2004 the Marshallese government 
has diligently shed fractions of its reliance on foreign support, but its overall reliance 
remains substantial. In 2004 RMI’s total external debts exceeded 75 percent of GDP.179 As 
of 2017, outstanding debts were nominally the similar but only 37 percent of GDP. This 
figure still places RMI’s debts above the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 30 percent 
threshold for high risk of debt distress.180 Currently, the nation’s top five revenue sources 
consist of the sale of fishing days to foreign vessels, local income taxes, royalties from 
foreign-controlled shipping registry corporations, import duties, and business taxes as 
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previously shown. Other major sources of funding over the past several decades include 
ODA from Taiwan and nearly $150 million in loans, grants, and technical assistance from 
the Asia Development Bank (ADB) since 1994.181  
RMI’s risk of debt distress has placed its national goals for political, social, and 
economic development in the hands of its international partners. After designating it as high 
risk in 2010, the IMF subsequently placed RMI on a “grants only” status—discontinuing its 
access to loan-based development.182 Consequently, the ADB, the World Bank, the EU, 
and Japan have each responded by surging ODA-grant availability to an extent that exceeds 
RMI’s local capacities to program and implement much of it in the near term.183 In February 
2019, RMI became the first country to program $44 million out of the World Bank’s $2.7 
billion dollar “Green Climate Fund.”184 Recent domestic efforts to break stagnation include 
the governments adoption of a cryptocurrency (SOV) and a proposal to declare the Rongelap 
atoll a free economic zone in hopes of creating “the next Hong Kong.”185   
4. Micronesian Interests 
True to its political origins, the government of the Federated States of Micronesia 
leaves the bulk of responsibility for the nation’s development in the hands of its four state 
governments in Yap, Chuuk, Korsae, and Pohnpei while the central government in Palikir 
deals mostly with purely national-level programs and deconflicting the autonomous agendas 
of these states.186 According to Article VIII of FSM’s constitution, “[a] power expressly 
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delegated to the national government, or a power of such an indisputably national character 
as to be beyond the power of a state to control, is a national power,” while “[a] power not 
expressly delegated to the national government or prohibited to the states is a state 
power.” 187  Officials from Palikir represent the whole of FSM and the interests of its 
103,000 residents through embassies in Tokyo, Suva, Beijing, and Washington, DC, along 
with its consulates established in Honolulu, Guam, and Portland Oregon. The capital also 
hosts diplomatic missions from Australia, Japan, the United States, and the PRC. 188 
Economically, FSM operates on a “two-part system” which affords jurisdiction for foreign 
investments “of a national character” to the central government while states maintain 
autonomy in matters of their own FDI.189 
FSM’s Compact with the United States fundamentally drives FSM’s national 
strategy and development agendas, but not all this drive has been positive. Like the other 
Compact nations, the COFA acts as a load-bearing column for both foreign relations and 
economic development as FSM received roughly $1.3 billion worth of Compact grants 
between 1986 and 2001 and negotiated for another $2.1 billion in obligations for grants and 
trust fund contributions through 2023 via the 2003 amendment. Unique to FSM, state 
governments have responsibilities to implement grant funding for their respective states in 
coordination with national stakeholders.190 The federalization of economic support created 
far more complications for Micronesians in implementing their development agendas under 
the amended Compact’s terms which some have described as “lip service to the notion of 
achieving budgetary self-reliance and economic self-sustainability.” 191  Development 
program managing units (PMUs) struggled to balance between principles of autonomy and 
coordinated development after the amended Compact came into effect in 2004. From a 
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Micronesian perspective, disputes between levels of governments, a lack of coherent 
policies, and decisions made by the Compact’s administering body—the USDOI-FSM Joint 
Economic Management Committee (JEMCO)—contributed to significant losses in 
economic potential for the nation. Washington may have lost some political capital as well. 
In light of failing implementation, JEMCO placed a freeze on funding earmarked for 
infrastructure in 2012 until Palikir could publish an updated national infrastructure 
development plan.192 Micronesian officials note that this decision, “led to a decline in 
construction activity of 26 percent in FY2013 followed by 41 percent in FY2014,” and 
contributed “the worst period of economic performance since the start of Amended 
Compact.”193 Appendix B provides a snapshot of key political and socioeconomic events 
for FSM from 1989 to 2019. 
FSM’s economic recession from 2012 to 2015 has driven an expansion of 
centralized strategies and goals that the nation would otherwise rather have left to its states. 
In addition to an 8 percent contraction of the economy, FSM’s Compact Trust Fund (FSM-
CFT) had performed far below anticipated growth rates since its inception in 2004 and, 
during the recession, signaled threats of a fiscal crisis once Compact grant funding ceases in 
2023. 194  Faced with these economic security challenges, Palikir established two 
overarching national goals in its plan of action to unfreeze its economy: fiscal balance by 
2024, and a 2% national economic growth rate.195 Development objectives span economic, 
social, and environmental outcomes, and the government’s medium-term efforts along with 
infrastructure development, include tax reform; more effective governance; an improved 
business environment; and economic expansion in tourism, fisheries, and agriculture.196 
Along with these priorities, President Peter Christian also seeks to preserve the unity of 
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Micronesia against secessionist movements in Chuuk—FSM’s largest state in terms of area 
and population.197  
FSM estimates that between FY2016 to FY2025 it will have access to roughly $780 
million in funding solely for infrastructure development and maintenance.198 Figure 17 
shows a breakdown of FSM’s anticipated group of donors and exhibits that roughly half of 
foreign support is expected via the U.S. Compact while China, Japan, and the ADB 
constitute the next three largest resource respectively.  
 
Figure 17. FSM Anticipated Funding Sources for Infrastructure199 
Within its Infrastructure Development Plan, FSM DTC&I describes some of the 
funding in Figure 17 as indicative rather than secured. The document explains and itemizes 
each instance by contributor but the overall logic of incorporating the indicative funding is 
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provided by the following excerpt taken from the IDPs section on strategic planning titled 
“Working with Development Partners.”200 
Historically, FSM’s dialogue and coordination with non-US bilateral 
development partners has been weak due to the dominance of the Compact, 
but with 2023 looming has recently been strengthened. An Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) policy was approved by Congress in 
January 2014. The purpose of the policy is to establish approaches to 
managing ODA such that benefits are maximized for all stakeholders. The 
policy acknowledges, recognizes and respects the unique circumstances of 
each state but also seeks commonalities across FSM. Implementation of the 
policy began in 2014.201 
5. Palauan Interests  
The Republic of Palau (ROP) has similar interests as other Pacific Island Countries 
due to shared inherent structural issues, but the country also possesses unique motivations, 
challenges, and foreign relations born out of its success and specialization in economic 
development. Since 2000, Palau’s economy and national strategy have operated on two 
driving forces: construction and tourism. Today, the tiny nation of under 18,000 residents 
enjoys the highest per capita income of all PICs and ranks in the top 80th percentile of all 
countries on the UN Development Progamme’s Human Development Index.202 President 
Tommy Remengesau opened his 2019 State of the Republic address by recognizing his 
republic’s 25th independence together with 25 years of diplomatic relations with the United 
States and Japan and 20 years of relations with the Republic of China. Next, the president 
praises his country and its partners for their achievements, notes the World Bank’s decision 
to “graduate” Palau into a “High Income Country,” and explains bitter-sweetly that the 
nation no longer qualified for “many forms of international assistance [it] historically relied 
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upon to improve the living conditions of [its] people.”203 Since 1994, Palau’s reliance on its 
three strategic partner nations has evolved from direct support and financial assistance into 
market-based exchange, technical assistance, and investment partnerships. Appendix C 
provides a snapshot of key political and socioeconomic events that highlight Palau’s 
transition from a lower-income trust territory of the United States in 1994 to becoming the 
strongest case in the Pacific for late-stage transition nations from assistance recipient to 
enduring partner in 2019. 
The ROP government operates from a relatively simpler set of strategies compared 
to its larger and more vulnerable Compact counterparts. The country’s core concerns deal in 
conflicts of interests between continued economic development on one hand and cultural 
and ecological preservation on the other, and it addresses its issues through individual policy 
decisions and community consultation rather than comprehensive national programs. 
According to Palau’s Medium-Term Strategy for Sustainable Economic Development, the 
nation’s strategic priorities include preserving the environment, cultural values, political 
security, and effective relationships; addressing constraints to self-sufficiency; and 
implementation of effective governance for the benefit of the community as a whole.204 The 
government aims to meet its goals through policies that foster sustainable agricultural and 
fisheries opportunities, investing in both public infrastructure and foreign ventures to 
sustain social security, and making Palau the “island of choice for environmentally 
conscious visitors.”205 In 2015, the country turned to the USDOI to help develop a “master 
tourism plan,” which built on the ROP’s medium-term development strategies to frame a 
longer-term approach focused on the development of high-end tourism and delivering a 
national brand: “Pristine, Paradise. Palau.” 206 
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The ROP’s focus on sustainable tourism is not simply an idealistic notion, but a 
realistic strategy for addressing fundamental challenges for long-term social and economic 
development. Initially, Palau relied on COFA funding and foreign assistance at levels 
comparable to other former trust territories. The ROP’s unilateral COFA with the United 
States provided Palau with roughly $700 million in ODA between 1994 and 2010 during 
which time Japan and Taiwan also contributed significantly to economic and infrastructure 
development. Construction, spurred by large public sector projects such as the Japan-Palau 
Friendship Bridge and the Compact Road during the early and mid-2000s, had been a 
leading industry in Palau, and the inclusion of other infrastructure such as airport 
improvements and hotel construction allowed for opportunities in private sector tourism 
growth. 207  Palau’s tourism industry began showing growth in the early 2000s which 
prompted an increase in FDI and trade that expanded the economy 17 percent in five years. 
After a slowdown during the global financial crisis, grant funding fell to below a quarter of 
Palau’s GDP by 2010 with construction and tourism helping to replace ODA as the 
government’s primary revenue stream, as shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. Grant Funding as a Proportion of Palau’s GDP and Government 
Revenues Between 2000 and 2018.208 
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Employment and wages have increased steadily since 2000, and the labor market 
stays close to full with over half of the country’s 12,000 workers coming from virtually 
limitless labor pools abroad.209 Public administration, accommodation, retail, construction, 
and education make up three-quarters of the workforce, and Palauan citizens earn roughly 
50 percent more than foreign workers through  public sector or higher-skilled jobs.210 Table 
5 provides key economic measures and indicators for Palau. The top of Table 5 demonstrates 
steady economic growth through FY16 before successive drops in FY17 and FY18; “GDP 
Production” shows recent economic losses occurring most significantly in construction and 
accommodation; the center of the table more clearly demonstrates the long boom and sudden 
taper of Palau’s total tourism which accounts for hotel, restaurant, and value added tax 
(VAT) receipts; the bottom shows the contributions of taxes and grants in proportion to both 
one another as well as to total government revenues and demonstrates an increase in tax 
revenues as grants stay relative stable over time.  
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In 2015, Palau received 163,905 foreign tourists, which represented a 37 percent 
growth over 2014 and an increase of 88,000 annual visitors compared to 2010. Figure 19 
shows an independent assessment the bureau’s statistics demonstrating that Chinese tourists 
contributed all of the industry’s growth in visitors after 2014 as well as the majority of 
contraction as tourism dropped to substantially to 106,309 visits in 2018.212 Substantial 
reporting on the topic all center around a Chinese “travel ban” as the cause of the recent 
collapse in the sector.213  
Assessment of regional interests demonstrates that Palau’s strategic interests include 
economic growth through an expansion of high-quality tourism, ecological preservation, 
and cultural revival; that the ROP enjoys the highest per capita income of all PICs as well as 
a much lower reliance on foreign assistance than other Compact nations, and it continues to 
receive the majority of its FDI inflows from Japanese and Taiwanese sources. Palau strictly 
controls foreign ownership of companies, does not allow foreign ownership of land beyond 
99-year leases, and the government is cracking down on practices of foreigners creating 
“front” companies with silent local partners. Finally, initial assessment demonstrates that 
the nation expresses concerns of losing funding streams on account of earning a “high 
income” status, which has placed pressure on the government to seek new opportunities for 
investment and partnership; however, the degrees of demand, concern, and efforts to adapt 
have yet to fully develop.  
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Figure 19. Chinese contribution to Palau’s tourism by total visitors (2008-2018)214  
C. CHINESE INTERESTS 
The People’s Republic of China currently perceives itself within a “new normal” of 
social and economic development as the CCP continues in its Thirteenth Five-Year Plan 
“for the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects” by 2021.215 At the start 
of China’s Fourth Plan, the PRC joined the United Nations, replacing the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) as the international representative of the Chinese nation. Ending its 5th Plan, Deng 
Xiaoping announced China’s “opening up” to foreign engagement and a Joint Communique 
on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the United States.216 Between China’s 
Seventh through Ninth Plans, Beijing took “measures to reform its foreign aid mechanisms” 
and ramped up its contest with Taiwan to shape third-party behaviors against the ROC’s pro-
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independence movement.217 By 2001, China completely cast off its old mindset of self-
reliance and embraced a Going Global strategy that urged Chinese firms to leverage world 
trade and global markets to expand the prosperous society.218 From 2001 into the setting of 
the Thirteenth Plan, Beijing has adopted Going Global 2.0, a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
an Active Defense, Made in China 2025, and various trade and aid policies for increasing its 
engagement and leadership in the “new normal” environment. Appendix D provides an 
overview of political events and policies shaping China’s interests for increased engagement 
in the Central Pacific. 
1. National Political Interests  
At a grand-strategic level, the leadership of the CCP contend that “the Party’s 
leadership is the greatest strength of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and provides 
the fundamental political guarantee for sustained, healthy economic and social 
development.” 219  Guiding political principles for the CCP’s grand strategy include 
“strengthening Party self-governance,” “improving Party conduct” and “building a clean 
government” in order to “accelerate socialist modernization” in the new historic era.220 
Within these guiding principles the, domestic political goals for the period ending in 2020 
include expanding the political participation of citizens, strengthening party building, and 
“political development” within the armed forces. 221  Foreign goals include the use of 
political and diplomatic means to ensure peace, bolster development, and establishing 
multinational cooperative platforms for scientific innovation, finance, manufacturing 
production, and climate change.222 The CCP places an extra emphasis on actively pursuing 
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international cooperation for agriculture development in rural area. 223  Particular 
mechanisms for international cooperation include the AIIB, New Development Bank, and 
overseas Chinese who can act as “bridges of communication and bonds of friendship.224 
China proactively participates in cooperation with governments, IGOs, and institutions 
focused on climate change based on the principles of “mutual benefit”.225  
2. Economic Interests  
In 1978, China ranked 32nd in world trade, and its $20.6 billion U.S. dollar value of 
imports and exports accounted for less than 1 percent of the world’s total; by the end of 2010, 
China had become the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer, and Since 2011, 
“foreign trade, domestic investment and domestic consumption have become the three 
major engines propelling China’s economic growth.” 226  Beijing seeks to continue its 
economic successes through continued expansion in trade, reforming the global economic 
governance mechanisms, and leveraging the market system to increase the employment of 
Chinese citizens.227 The CCP sees itself as an advocate for improving market systems, 
establishing an equitable “new international economic and trade order,” and improving 
macroeconomic regulation.228 China aims to “guide the international economic agenda” 
and “safeguard the multilateral trade system.”229 The CCP also believes that trade with 
developing countries and emerging economies provide a significant development 
potential.230  
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3. Security Interests 
The CCP recognizes that “geopolitical competition is growing fiercer” with 
international relations “more complicated than ever” and “traditional and non-traditional 
security threats” becoming intertwined. 231  China’s “non-traditional” security includes 
economic security, cyberspace and information security, food and water security; social and 
public security; and eco-security.232 Each of these non-traditional forms impact China’s 
traditional national security which centers around securing both the nation’s national 
borders as well as “China’s political power and sovereignty.”233 In regards to political 
security, the CCP aims to ensure that “ideological work is carried out properly in order to 
safeguard China’s ideological security.”234 
As mentioned previously, China approach to “peace along it borders” emphasizes 
leveraging political and diplomatic means, but also calls for continued military development 
and adoptions in science and technology.235 China’s strategic concept of “active defense” 
embodies “the essence of the CPC’s military strategic thought.”236 Active defense involves 
a commitment to never strike first, but always strike back with decisive effect. The CCP 
prepares and directs its armed forces to perform a range of strategic tasks that includes active 
defense for safeguarding the sovereignty and unification of China; safeguarding China’s 
interests overseas and “in new domains;” maintaining strategic deterrence; participating in 
security cooperation; and protecting “against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to 
maintain China’s political security and social stability.”237 To support these goals China has 
continually grown its armed forces in recent decades with an emphasis on modernization 
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through physical restructuring and innovation. China reports total defense spending in 2018 
at $167 billion which ranks second in totals between the United States ($633.6 billion) and 
India ($66.6 billion); however, various expert observers assess the PRC’s actual 2018 
defense spending ranges between $210 billion and $239 billion.238 Given its economic 
growth, China’s defense budget has maintained a constant 2 percent of national GDP since 
2001, and has fallen from 12% to 5.5% of total government spending between 2001 and 
2018.239   
Since 2010, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have regarded joint operation 
systems “as the focal point of its modernization.” These systems aim to enhance PLA 
combat, command, and support systems as well as strengthening ideological and “political 
work” through the integrated use of information systems—described as 
“informationalization.” 240 Over the past decade, the PLA has worked to achieve a more 
scientific approach in innovating its political work “through education in ideology, guidance 
of opinion, and cultural edification” with regards to “the building of armed forces and 
changes to the state of mind of officers and men.241 Military doctrine stipulates that “the 
PLA should have a good understanding and mastery of the characteristics and laws of 
political work in [military operations other than war].”242 Practitioners have continued to 
advance the innovation of ideological and political work into a more actionable concept 
known referred to as the “Three Warfare’s”—legal warfare, public opinion, and 
psychological warfare—which aim to seize political advantage, foment psychological 
disintegration, and ultimately change the national policies of others through subversion.243 
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4. Chinese Interests in Oceania 1989 - 2018 
According to publicly available documents pertaining to PRC goals and strategy, the 
CCP does not maintain aspirational security interests in the Central Pacific beyond general 
policies of deterrence and defense. Observers and security experts from each of the major 
and middle Pacific powers discuss China’s maritime security goals and challenges in 
contexts tied to Admiral Liu Huanqing’s “Offshore Defense” strategy of the 1980s and 
American-based concepts of Island Chains. As shown in Figure 20, Admiral Huanqing 
conceptualized a “First Island Chain” which stretches from the Kurile Islands through Japan 
via Okinawa, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, through Sulawesi Indonesia and into 
Sumatra along with a “Second Island Chain” which runs from Tokyo through the Marianas 
and Guam, the Caroline’s Islands and Palau, terminating in Sulawesi. 244 According to 
“Offshore Defense,” areas within the first chain encompassed national strategic interests of 
territory, resources, and coastal defense zones, while the Second Island Chain would give 
Beijing control of East Asia’s oceans which Admiral Liu proposed to secure by 2020.245 
Chinese publications in more recent decades do not mention Offshore Defense or 
comparable strategies. Likewise, despite longstanding security cooperation agreements 
with Fiji, PNG, and Tonga, the PRC makes no mention of these nor any other Pacific Island 
nation in China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation.246 
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Figure 20. Admiral Liu Huaqing’s Offshore Defense 247 
The PRC’s economic interests in the region has grown steadily over the past 
decades; however, China’s economic engagement with the Pacific Islands has recently 
become grossly overestimated in recent years. According to several prominent research 
reports produced in recent years, China is “the largest trading partner of PIF member 
countries,” and “China’s trade with the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea comprised 
72 percent of its total trade with PIF members.” 248  Figure 21, taken from a 2017 
congressional research report, shows China’s trade with the Marshall Islands totaling $3.4 
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billion in a single year and represents one of several of such estimates. While the data is 
technically correct—based on official international trade data, nearly all value associated 
with shipments to and from the Marshall Islands “are a quirk of U.S. regulations.”249 
Ignoring the details and implications of this “quirk” for the moment, Beijing’s trade with the 
region has indeed grown from approximately $2 billion to over $8 billion in total imports 
and exports as demonstrated in Figure 22. While this figure is certainly significant relative 
to the small economies in the PICs, the amount has almost no significance relative to the 
PRCs $1.7 trillion in total annual trade with all of Asia and the Pacific or $4 trillion in its 
annual global exchange of goods.  
 
Figure 21. Congressional Research Report Figure Indicating China’s Trade with 
the Marshall Islands totaling $3.4 Billion in 2015.250 
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became-a-top-u-s-crude-export-destination-idUSL8N1AT07P. 




Figure 22. Growth of Total Trade between the PRC and  
Pacific Island Countries (2007–2017)251  
In terms of economic security, Pacific Island countries only present some value to 
China terms of what precious metals or minerals can be extracted or jobs created through 
overseas ventures and investments. China’s most relevant partners and sources for  metals 
and materials outside of Australia and New Zealand have been Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands and New Caledonia.252 Investments into PNG have totaled 1.5 billion 
since 2010, with Samoa being the only other PIC to receive an investment over $100 million 
over the past decade.253 PNG provides the PRC with 2.5 percent of imported petroleum gas, 
2.7 percent of precious metal ores, 6.3 percent of timber, and 31 percent of imported 
nickel.254 Another 24 percent of China’s nickel mattes come from New Caledonia which 
also provides 7 percent of the PRCs imported ferroalloys and 2.5 percent of cobalt, while 
the Solomon Islands provide 5% of its wood.255 Chapter V contains an assessment of 
 
251 Source: Meick, Ker, and Chan, China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Implications for the 
United States, 7–8. 
252 Jian Zhang, 2015, “China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region,” 47. 
253 China Power,  https://chinapower.csis.org/china-foreign-direct-investment/ 




potentially significant resource-based relations between U.S. compact countries and China; 
however, any other niche China-PIC trade relationship that may exist falls beyond the scope 
of this study.   
The CCP’s central political interests within Oceania pertain to its longstanding 
efforts to isolate Taiwan’s pro-independence movement. In 1989, five of the current island 
nations (Fiji, Samoa, PNG, Kiribati, and Samoa) officially recognized the PRC while three 
(Tuvalu, Nauru, and the Solomon Islands) recognized Taiwan. Both Beijing and Taipei have 
engaged the region continuously through official diplomacy, ODA, and “other financial 
flows” in order to shape the political affiliations of each country. This method of political 
shaping earned term “check book diplomacy” in the 1990s when the independence 
movement ramped up between the two chief parties. 256 Table 6 demonstrates the nine 
changes in diplomatic relations between 1989 and 2019, and Figure 23 shows the alignment 
of countries recognizing either the PRC or Taiwan in 2018. The Solomon Islands and 
Kiribati both changed diplomatic ties from the PRC to Taiwan in September of 2019.257 
Table 6. Changes in Pacific Island Countries’ Recognition of the PRC or Taiwan. 
 
() indicates date of official diplomatic recognition 
 
256 Jian Zhang, 2015. “China’s Role in the Pacific Islands Region,” 51. 
257 Melissa Clarke. 2019. “Kiribati cuts ties with Taiwan to switch to China, days after the Solomon 
Islands.” 20 September 2019. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-20/kiribati-to-switch-diplomatic-ties-
from-taiwan-to-china/11532192 accessed 26 September 2019. 
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Figure 23. Disposition of Pacific Island Nations Recognizing China or  
Taiwan Prior to September 2019 258 
D. MACRO-LEVEL ASSESSMENT OF CHINA’S INTERESTS IN 
MICRONESIA  
China’s interests in Micronesia appear relatively limited from a regional perspective 
over most of the past three decades, and cursory evidence suggests that the political isolation 
of Taiwan represents the single greatest interest for China by far. The CCP does not 
publicize nor endorse plans reflecting military expansion, and its vague notions to 
“safeguard interests overseas” would seem to hardly apply to a region that provides 
relatively little economic benefits. Official exchange between the PRC and the RMI or Palau 
have essentially been non-existent to include the period when RMI recognized Beijing as 
the government of China from 1990 to 1998. Exchanges with FSM’s officials on the other 
hand have expanded significantly and constitutes a “strategic partnership” to the extent that 
 
258 John Garrick, “Soft power goes hard: China’s economic interest in the Pacific comes with strings 
attacked” October 16, 2018, https://theconversation.com/soft-power-goes-hard-chinas-economic-interest-
in-the-pacific-comes-with-strings-attached-103765. 
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official Chinese messaging denotes strategic partnerships. Using information examined thus 
far, this Chapter will conclude with a cursory look at three initial research hypotheses. 
H2: China’s political objectives in the central Pacific grow more assertive and antithetical 
to American interests as countries become more dependent on Chinese trade and capital 
flows. 
Economic exchange between China and Micronesian states has been marked by 
increased trade ODI to FSM, limited but locally significant FDI in the Marshall Islands, and 
gradual increases trade that rose in significance beginning in 2008, but to degrees far less 
than major U.S. reports in recent years has suggested. Figure 24 shows the years in which 
China became a top three-trading partner with Palau (2015) and FSM (2016) and 
demonstrates a sharp drop in goods and services received from Palau after 2017.  
 
Figure 24. China’s Increased Trade within Micronesia (1995-2017)259 
 
259 Source: Ricardo Hausman, Atlas of Economic Complexity, Harvard Growth Lab, Cambridge 
Center for International Development, 2017. http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/explore.  
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Multiple sources to include the 2018 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission have cited UN COMTRADE and IHS Markit Global Trade Atlas data 
indicating that China’s trade with the Marshall Islands included multiple billions of dollars 
in exports. These spikes in trade begin in 2011 and 2015; however, 99.8% of exports in 2015 
actually passed through foreign companies domiciled in the RMI.260 Based on WTO data, 
China actually exported roughly $7 million in goods received, while importing $24 million 
in goods—tuna specifically—that year.261 Imports of Marshallese tuna did increase from 
zero in 2008 to $74 million in 2013, then fell steadily to under $20 million since 2016. More 
notable economic engagement between China and RMI were foreign direct investments 
made occurred during the financial crisis in 2008–2009 and between 2012 and 2013 when a 
Chinese company purchased the Pan Pacific Fisheries processing plant in Majuro and a 
registered a number of fishing vessels within the RMI as a joint venture in tuna fishing.262  
The strongest evidence for PRC assertiveness is shown in its efforts to coerce Palau 
by encouraging companies to promote trade via tourism and then positioning Palau 
government into severing ties with Taiwan. China’s share in Palau’s tourism rose to one-
fifth of its total value prior to dropping dramatically in 2017 and beyond due to restrictions 
imposed by the government banning organized travel packages for Chinese tourists. This 
evidence only holds on the premise that coercive actions against Taiwan opposes American 
interests by extension. This research argues that it does, given U.S. guarantees of ensuring a 
non-coercive resolution between the ROC an PRC which itself represents American values 
and practices supporting rules-based order. This assessment also finds that economic 
coercion towards Palau does not demonstrate evidence of attempting to shaping U.S. 
security positions or policies within the ROP.  
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Evidence for assertive political objectives are not as readily apparent in FSM or the 
Marshall Islands from a regional perspective. In FSM, the PRC has clearly messaged intent 
to help alleviate the country’s fiscal cliff, which is directly tied to the discontinuation of U.S. 
Compact funding; however, recent, current, and future levels ODA, while increasing, 
indicate long-term financial support equivalent to that of Japan, the World Bank, and the 
ADB which reflects a more cooperative development agenda over the long term. Further 
assessment of Chinese activities related to ODA in FSM is required. Similarly, China’s 
increased trade and direct investment has turned the PRC into a top-five source of financing 
for Marshall Islands; however, additional information is required in regards to the geo-
economic nature of investments pertaining to commercial fishing as well as accusations by 
the country’s president that Chinese entities have attempted to subvert Marshallese politics 
in order to turn the Rongelap atoll into a “Special Administrative Region” of lax tax 
standards and entry requirements.263 Figure 25 provides a summary of initial evidence 
suggesting plausibility of different geo-economic, geopolitical, and geo-economic 
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Figure 25. Assessment of Chinese Geo-economic Strategies in Micronesia 
H4: China’s foreign engagements within Micronesia increase during periods of political 
dispute with the United States.  
From a regional perspective, the relationship between Chinese economic 
engagement to U.S.-Micronesian relations is highly circumstantial at best, but broad links 
in economic engagement to political affairs does provide initial insight into further sub-
national case study. Two topics of dispute standout between the United States and Compact 
nations over the past several decades. The first case involves the management of Compact 
sector funding in FSM between 2004 and 2017, which peaked with the freezing of 
infrastructure funding in 2012. Chinese ODA began to increase in size and scope in 2002, 
jumped substantially at the offset of the 2008 global financial crisis, and has increased steady 
ever since. FSM has been a top five ODA recipient since 2014 (alongside PNG, Fiji, Samoa, 
and Vanuatu), and in 2016 China announced its decision to grant $5 million in untied aid to 
Palikir for every year from 2017 to 2024.  
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The second case involves RMI’s ongoing disputes over the restoration of atolls used 
for nuclear testing and whether Marshallese grievances have any connection with alleged 
Chinese plans to commercialized Rongelap. US-RMI disputes over radioactive fallout and 
presence of nuclear materials saw their highest periods of friction (within this research 
timeframe) in 1995, 2000, and 2014 though recent studies and reporting by experts at 
Columbia University have sparked renewed debate as recent as late 2019.264  In 1988 a 
tribunal held by the UN International Court of Justice determined that the United States 
should compensate the RMI $2.3 billion in claims and damages, and even though the RMI 
government agreed to lesser claims with the signing of the COFA, the tribunal findings are 
still used as a point of grievance.265  In 1995, the RMI government rejected a U.S. study 
finding the majority of previously contaminated atolls safe for resettlement, In 2000, the 
RMI government petitioned for U.S. compensation—in addition to Compact funding—to 
subsidize Marshallese healthcare until 2050.266 In 2014, RMI filed suits with California and 
the International Court of Justice claiming that nuclear powers were failing to uphold 
obligations under the 1968 Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.267 Despite claim settlements, 
rehabilitation, and assurances that atolls have been deemed safe for resettlement, 
Marshallese grievances and skepticism persist, which has left the Rongelap and Bikini atolls 
essentially unsettled.268 At this point each of these hypotheses can only be deemed plausible 
by research at the regional level on Chinese political and economic engagement; however 
these data do provide reasonable points for initiating further assessment of Chinese 
statecraft and political warfare at the sub-national level. 
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V. CHINESE ENGAGEMENTS IN MICRONESIA 1989–2019 
Using the findings for the PRCs political and economic engagement in Micronesia 
from a regional perspective, this Chapter provides the analysis of five sub-national case 
studies in order to provide greater clarity and analysis of details pertaining to Chinese 
sanctions against Palau, development assistance in FSM and investments in the Marshall 
Islands. Given the absence of official channels through which to assess instruments of 
statecraft in the RMI, assessment of potential avenues for political warfare in the Marshalls 
focus on less-than-official channels of social and political influence.   
A. SHARP EMPLOYMENT OF TOURISM IN PALAU  
The CCP’s negative sanctions against Palau’s tourism industry as an economic 
means for political ends is currently the most reported, best understood, and least debated 
form of economic statecraft covered within the five case studies in this Chapter. It may also 
be the least significant in terms of effectiveness and potential impact on United States 
security interests. As discussed in Chapter IV, Palau’s tourism industry contributes over 80 
percent of exports, represents half of Palau’s economy, and receipts from tourism dropped 
from $148 million in 2015 to $117 million through 2018. Initial assessment of Palau’s 
interests and positions demonstrated that China’s leverage on Palau’s tourism industry 
represents a significant risk to the country’s economic security. Further analysis suggests 
that Beijing’s leverage and Palau’s vulnerability have each become somewhat 
sensationalized across some reporting, but also that the underlying intent of the PRC to use 
its leverage to shape Palau’s recognition of Taiwan is virtually undeniable. While some 
details of the CCP’s use of tourism as a means requires minor points of clarification so as 
not to perpetuate exaggerations of coercion, all reporting across government studies, 
academic research, and global, regional, and local media share the same consensus—that 
Beijing imposed sanctions on tourism to Palau in order to shake the country’s political 
relations with Taiwan. 
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China’s leveraging of tourism to advance its “One Policy” agenda, isolate Taiwan, 
and signal discontent to the international community have all been substantively  
documented for Palau along with other cases involving Turkey, Vatican City, and South 
Korea, with ongoing observation and discussion involving pressure on New Zealand.269 In 
the 1990s, the PRC established its Approved Destination Status (ADS) list which has since 
become a multi-purpose tool of the government for leveraging the economic flows 
associated with its growing sector of middle-class travelers toward countries that support 
the CCP’s political positions and away from those that do not. China first brought attention 
to its ADS as a carrot when it provided Turkey a place on the list in exchange for safe passage 
through its waterways.270 Then in 2017, the CCP demonstrated the coercive power of its 
tourism by imposing internal restrictions and penalties on travel to South Korea following 
the ROK’s commitment to accommodate U.S. missile defense systems. That same year, 
Beijing also directed travel agencies to stop booking group of tours to Vatican City and 
Palau.271  Sixty different hotel projects across Palauan islands leased by Chinese investors 
prior to 2017 were put all put on hold, and  by 2018 Taiwanese airlines began suspending 
routes from China to the ROP. China’s State Council has addressed its travel bans as an 
impetus of the “One China” principle.272 
The positive impacts of Chinese visitors on Palau’s tourism industry between 2014 
and 2017 represented more of a flash in the pan on the margins of nation’s foundational 
development rather than the supposed gold rush Chinese tourism has received attention over, 
and the ROP has already adapted to increase its resilience and long-term prospects for the 
industry in the future. Figure 26 shows an excerpt of subsequent analysis conducted by the 
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some of the country’s technical assistance teams demonstrating their assessment that the 
loss in Chinese tourism has only impacted Palau’s “low end” tourism market.273 In fact, the
ROP had already been under significant pressure to contain the negative impacts of low-end 
tourism prior to 2015, which had first become apparent in the 2008 economic development 
plan and reinforced through substantial reporting on local concerns leading to the 
development of Palau’s “master tourism plan” published in 2016.274 
Figure 26. Excerpt of analyses on China’s economic impact on 
Palauan tourism markets (2008-2018)275
A common narrative for the Palau case is that Beijing had actively pushed tourism 
toward the nation before signaling and initiating a ban in order to actively pressure the ROP 
into a dependency-based request for diplomatic ties; however the sensational narrative 
273 Graduate School USA, Economic Review Palau FY2018, July 2019. 
http://www.pitiviti.org/news/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2019/07/Palau_FY18_EconReview_web.pdf. 
Washington, DC, : DoI Office of Insular Affairs, 19–20. 
274 Government of Palau and Asia Development Bank, Actions for Palau’s Future 2009–2014: The 
Medium-Term Development Strategy, OP and ADB, n.d. http://prdrse4all.spc.int/system/files/palau 
_medium_term_development_strategy_2009-2014_-_explanatory_booklet.pdf. 22. 
275 Source: Graduate School USA, Economic Review Palau FY2018, July 2019. 
http://www.pitiviti.org/news/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2019/07/Palau_FY18_EconReview_web.pdf. 
Washington, DC, : DoI Office of Insular Affairs, 20. 
90 
misrepresents the CCP’s approach. 276  Beijing is not communicating ultimatums at an
executive level but rather relying on passive signals, societal pressures, and informal 
networks to apply pressures toward desirable political outcomes. According to President 
Remengesau Beijing had never communicated officially with his government either in 
regard to the imposed restrictions or with offers to replace expiring U.S. Compact funding, 
but his government has discussed the latter issue internally.277 In terms of Chinese tourism
and investment, Palau’s approach involved simply welcoming and managing the flows as 
they naturally came.278 From the government’s perspective, the rising number of Chinese
tourists did not equate to success for Palau, but “it actually made us more determined to seek 
the policy of quality versus quantity.”279 The current administration, like those prior, has
staunchly supported the diplomatic independence of Taiwan who it sees as more closely 
aligned in terms of “principles and democratic ideals.” 280  However, Palauan Jackson
Henry, former ambassador to Taiwan and Chairman of Palau Visitors Authority recognizes 
that Palauan desire partnership with both Taiwan and China to the furthest extent possible, 
and that “mainland Chinese are looking towards the next administration,” which changes 
over in 2021, to improve the bilateral relationships. 
Palau will most likely reset and cautiously move toward finding ways to bring in 
independent tourists and business partners under conditions that more strictly align with its 
own policy of high-quality low-impact tourism. Reports show that tourism from China is 
shifting from predominantly organized to increasingly independent, which waters down the 
level of state control and leverage available to the CCP.281 Given its experiences, Palauan
society will likely seek to balance its government’s economic and pollical relations across 
the nation’s range of partners as well as the PRC and PIF community. The only real concern 
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for malign CCP influence going forward would be whether individual points of leverage 
could be created as Palau’s government transitions through subsequent administrations; 
however, the environment will likely be more primed to resist outside pressures and 
enticements through at least the current election cycle. Palauan parliamentary speaker 
Sabino Anastacio has become an advocate of switching diplomatic ties from Taiwan to 
China, and local reporting suggests that Speaker Anastacio’s business relationships with 
Chinese developers has at least some bearing on this position.282 Taiwan is less concerned 
with the CCP’s economic coercion as it is with inducements as the ROC Foreign Ministry 
assesses that Beijing has lured four countries to switch diplomatic recognition in the past 
two years through its more effective use of generous aid packages and investment.283 
B. POSITIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN THE FSM’S YAP STATE 
FSM’s second-smallest federated state of Yap has roughly as many citizens as Palau, 
but while its neighbor 280 miles southwest has seen tourism expand to 160,000 visitors in a 
single year, Yap continues to receive roughly 4,000 tourists annually.284 Early in 2012, Yap 
Governor Sabastian Anefal signed an agreement allowing Chinese developer Exhibition and 
Travel Group (ETG) to lease lands from local owners with initial enticements of economic 
development extending from a mega-resort, casinos, golf courses, marinas, and a new 
runway for regularly chartered jets full of tourists. Following the state’s post-agreement 
announcement, segments of the public began to push back due to a perceived lack of 
information and transparency.285 While Governor Anefal coordinated with ETG, Yap State 
Congresswoman Madeline Bordallo released a statement calling for the inclusion of 
Chinese visitors under the Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program. Congresswoman Bordallo 
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called for the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Defense to loosen policies in 
order to better accommodate the flow of Chinese visitors, adding that China’s willingness 
to initiate direct flights to Yap from China “highlight [ed] the importance and urgency” of 
expanding the program. Both the governor’s land-lease and the congresswoman’s travel 
policies demonstrate two likely short-term goals of a broader campaign of the CCP efforts 
to establish physical and political control of the state.  
Prior to serving as governor of Yap, FSM Foreign Minister Sabastian Anefal 
traveled to Beijing in 2006 to meet with Chinese officials to map out FSM’s Program of 
Action within the context of the PRC’s newly formed China-Pacific Island Countries 
Economic Development and Cooperation forum. Official visits and economic cooperation 
had already become routine between Beijing and Palikir by 2006, but the forum represented 
new efforts between the countries to increase personnel exchanges and, in FSMs case, 
expand tourism.286  By 2012, the PRC had provided several hundred thousand dollars to 
Yap for small assistance programs, such as the construction of community centers, 
government assistance, and crisis response, but the facilitated tourism effort represented an 
entirely new economic outlook. The government’s attempt to test its nation’s locals-only 
land management norms split opinions dramatically, with some landowning families 
signing 99-year agreements with ETG and others holding out. 287   ETG’s immediate 
responses were clear, “if Yapese people do not lease their land, then E.T.G. will leave. No 
land means no investment.”288 Mr. Yang Gang’s company did not leave. ETG purchased 
the existing Yap Dive Resort and appointed Gang General Manager. In 2013, the CCP 
arrested ETG’s chairman, and whether for the arrest, public discontent towards the project’s 
scope, Chinese labor stipulations, disagreements on payouts, or combinations of above, the 
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project has sat.289 In the meantime, the company still holds fifty leases with the majority of 
the property in municipalities of Fanif and Maap.290 As of 2018, ETG still maintained plans 
to deliver a scaled-back version of construction and tourism.291 They also maintain that they 
do not work at the behest of the Chinese government. 
ETG was founded in 1997 and has promoted urban development through tourism 
and exhibition-based real estate both within and outside of the PRC.292 The company is 
owned and operated by one of China’s wealthiest billionaires—Mr. Deng Hong, and has 
distinctions of constructing both the world’s largest building—the New Century Global 
Center in Chengdu as well as the controversial InterContinental Resort in Lhasa, Tibet.293 
Mr. Hong handed off a 30 percent stake in the Shawan Exhibition Centre ETG built to the 
city government without charge in 2001 and told the Washington Post that “my business 
depends on the government” in 2002.294 In 2011, ETG “responded to the state’s strategic 
development call of GOING GLOBAL” by establishing the International Investment 
Department to integrate with other resources and promote development for overseas tourism 
projects.295 After being arresting by the anti-corruption police, Deng resurfaced in 2017, 
returned to ETG as chairman, and “has continued to assert his intention to invest and build 
in Yap.”296 The most recent reporting suggests that ETG is reluctant to move forward due 
to the state’s newer demands of business plans and annual reviews of operations.297 The 
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same local reporting also challenges claims by major Chinese fishing company Luin Thai 
which has publicized agreements to build port facilities on Yap. State officials maintain that 
these claims “misrepresent” actual arrangements which only provided Luin Thai with short 
lease while the government awaits formal plans from the company.298  
On the opposite, eastern end of the nation, individuals and groups within the state of 
Chuuk have been pushing for independence from the Federated States. Chuuk has 
historically been the most independent minded among FSM states since independence, and 
in 2012 a group of pro-successionists organized the Chuuk State Political Status 
Commission (CSPSC) in order to work through proceedings for securing a referendum on 
independence for a Chuuk Republic. In 2014, the CSPSC issued its report to the state 
government outlining the basis of succession as well as its perceived prospects for future 
economic development and transition to political independence. The commission’s 
grievances outline that the “status quo” between the existing FSM constitutional framework 
and the Compacts of Free Association with the United States inhibits “foreign affairs which 
could enable assistance to our country,” and argues that, given autonomy, Chuuk could 
accelerate its development and correct for the structural disadvantages and injustices 
suffered under federated status.299 Within its assessment of “Prospective Economic Future 
Under Independence” the commission references vague “access to foreign economic 
resources,” argues that its entitled share of Compact Trust Funds would contribute to 
significantly to national revenues, and also that Chuuk could realize $40 million annually 
from untapped resources within and under the waters of its EEZ. 300  Local anti-
independence activist point the vagueness of commission members’ plans for funding and 
misrepresentations of the current and future COFA arrangements as chief complaints 
against the movement.301 Despite public skepticism, after years of working through legal 
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and political processes Chuuk’s state legislature scheduled a referendum for March of 2019, 
which Governor Johnson Elimo subsequently rescheduled to March of 2020 citing the need 
for more consultation. 
China has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in developing its ties with FSM 
since 2000, and Chuuk has received direct assistance to an extent that rivals that given to the 
federal government.302 The PRC has either provided funding or the full construction for a 
stadium, reconstruction of airport and seaport facilities, a hospital, a government complex 
and several smaller programs in the sectors of agriculture and energy production. Upon 
completion of the hospital project, the PRC has maintained a full medical team for services 
and capacity building within the Chuuk State. Figure 27 provides a condensed sample of 
China’s activities and aid within both Yap and Chuuk beginning in 2000; additional data are 
provided in Appendix E demonstrating a fuller look at Chinese engagement across the three 
Compact nations. progression of initial aid-based engagement to current Chinese ownership 
of land. During an interview with FSM’s Chief Justice in 2008, outgoing Chinese 
Ambassador H.E. Liu Fei highlighted restoration projects, the medical program, and 
electricity projects in Chuuk as well as developments to tap China’s 37 million tourists a 
year among the top five priorities of PRC’s support to the nation. The interview also captures 
an inquiry from the Chief Justice requesting China to consider the use of non-government 
organizations to work with civil society on grass roots development; Ambassador Fei’s 
response was that the Embassy “does not deal with that kind of arrangement” and that 
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ID # Dates Event Description Excerpts Instrument (D,E,P,M) and Activities Local Impact 
C7 2006 China holds first China-Pacific Island 
Countries Economic Cooperation and 
Development Forum 
D-Agenda Setting for 
Economic Development 
Access to 300 
entrepreneurs 
across China and 
the PICs 
31 2009 2009, China pledges $70,000 grant 
for meeting house in Meerur village  








Dengue outbreak in 2011 leads to the 
health department request for 
assistance.  
China provides two separate 
donations months after the outbreak. 
D- Humanitarian Aid Unknown details 
regarding 
donations 
 2012 ETG proposes a 4,000-unit resort 
with golf clubs, marina, convention 
center and casino. 
D- MOU to Develop;  
E- promises of trade and 
capital; P- guarantees of 
economic security  
Forfeiture of land 
rights for 99 years 
 2012 Yapese public and landowners split 
over whether to lease lands to ETG 
P- ETG holds firm. “No 
land,” “No Deal” 
Public tensions, 
grievances mount 
 2012 ETG purchases Yap Dive Resort   







An undeclared and unresponsive 
Chinese research vessel is confiscated 
by local authorities immediately off 
the Maap community coast. 
Vessel possesses a permit to conduct 
EEZ research scheduled for the 
following week issued by Palikir. 
Vessel also has a USDOS-PRC cable 
granting requests for research. 
   
44a 2016 PRC provides grant to purchase a Y-
12 under terms of sourcing through 
AVIC Harbin Aircraft Industry Group 




44b 2017 Completed Y-12 plane arrives in Yap 
for cargo transport, rescue and 
medical services 
  
 2017 Luen Thai Fishing Company signs a 
“deal” to “build a fishing port” on 
Yap. Not according to Yap State 
Officials. Five-year lease has been 






 2018 Deng returns to Palau as the 
reinstated chairman of ETG to assess 




Figure 27. Excerpts from readers’ guide to Chinese engagement with FSM, Palau, 
rMI, and CNMI. Adapted from sources listed in Appendix E. 
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The combination of official and unofficial engagements in Yap and Chuuk suggest 
efforts by the PRC to offer promises of economic security in exchange for land, loosened 
policies for access, and looser governance and oversight of corporate land management. 
Yap’s local officials willingly advanced the PRC’s policy efforts in order to secure promises 
for development; however, pushback by local constituents demonstrates a degree of urgency 
and pressure to secure deals faster than publics can deliberate the details. In the case of 
Chuuk, the PRC is likely providing assurances of economic security in order to facilitate a 
succession that would afford greater opportunities for bilateral engagement outside of the 
security arrangements created by the U.S. COFA. 
C. SMART POWER WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS IN THE 
MARSHALL ISLANDS 
Based on initial findings, Chapter V’s assessment of the Marshall Islands focuses on 
Chinese activities that support CCP interest through the building of local political influence 
through RMIs fishing industry and efforts to stoke anti-American sentiment by leveraging 
historical grievances involving past nuclear testing in the northern atolls. The first case 
demonstrates that major Chinese SOEs have become a large and growing presence in this 
industry, and evidence suggest that current presence will continue to develop into significant 
economic dependencies as well as expanded coastal facilities. The second case of Rongelap 
does not provide any evidence of CCP interests and influence beyond the speculations of 
senior political officials and western regional media.  
Total reliance on foreign assistance has decreased in the RMI since 2004 largely due 
to growth in fishing revenues. The Marshallese economy also trudges forward through 
modest growth in other areas, but the Marshallese government currently reaps as much 
economic benefits from foreign fishing companies as it receives from domiciled shipping 
companies, import duties, and local business taxes combined. Fishing looks to be the only 
viable industry through which the country might make up for losses in foreign assistance 
over the short-term once development-based elements of Compact funding cease in 2024. 
Unfortunately, local commercialization has contributed to less than half of the industry’s 
growth and most revenues come from licensing access of the nation’s local tuna stocks to 
foreign companies.  
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Six major distant water fishing nation (DWFN) fleets operate within the WCPO 
purse seine fishery—Japan, (Republic of) Korea, Taiwan, China, the United States, and the 
Philippines. The PRC was the last DWFN to enter the WCPO, and its fleet has grown 
considerably since the early 2000s to its current size of fifteen vessels and an additional six 
“beneficially-owned” RMI-flagged vessels.304 This fleet is closely linked to the China’s 
tuna processing industry and the government provides substantial subsidies for “operations, 
vessel construction and the building or expansion of overseas bases.”305 In 2014, the PRC 
spent $3 billion in subsidies for its distant water fleets; however, vessel-based subsidies has 
“since been reduced, with funds…diverted to drive investment in port facilities.” 306 
Financial support for the establishment  of bases has primarily gone towards China’s 
longline fishing industry for bases in Palau, Yap, Pohnpei, Kosrae, Majuro, and Samoa, 
except in the Marshall Islands which is the only shore-based investment linked to purse 
seining—commercial net fishing—in the PICs.307  
Shanghai Kaichuang Deep Sea Fisheries Corporation, who purchased Marshall 
Island’s Pan Pacific Fisheries plan in 2008, has been a “notable recipient” of these 
government subsidies.308 China’s SOE Bright Food group, controls Shanghai Kaichuang 
Marine International which owns Kaichuang Deep Sea—the third largest seafood company 
in China.309 In addition to the Majuro-based plant, Kaichuang also operates the largest of 
five Chinese purse seiner fleets in the WCPO consisting of six Chinese-flagged vessels and 
the six vessels flagged in the Marshall Islands. 310  The company “readily admits” that 
operation of the processing plant serves to gain fishery access around the RMI, and that “the 
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facility has operated at about one-fifth of its full capacity” since Kaichuang purchased the 
plant.”311 
China’s total fifteen-vessel purse seine fleet fishes mostly within the EEZs of 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands and Nauru, and receives 26 days a year for fishing in the high 
seas.312 However, because the beneficially owned RMI-flagged vessels have unlimited 
high seas access, Kaichuang receives this same benefit afforded to local operators by 
extension. With local designation, Kaichuang’s six Chinese-crewed vessels also have 
eligibility to gain access to all zones covered under separate fishing provisions of the FSM 
Arrangement. China does not generally allow its vessels to operate under flags of 
convenience; however, the China Overseas Fisheries Association describes the situation in 
the RMI as “a special case because the vessels are directly connected to an onshore 
fishery.” 313  Ultimate control of China’s distant fleets reside with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ Bureau of Fisheries with the Overseas Fisheries Association 
acting as a conduit between the government and overseas fishing companies.314 Beijing 
requires all Chinese overseas fishing companies to establish membership in the OFA, and 
among its other regulatory duties the organization provides “assistance in situations 
overseas when diplomatic solutions are impractical.”315  
The Marshall Island’s Rongelap atoll has been at the center of Marshallese 
grievances against the United States since nuclear fallout contaminated the Island during 
nuclear tests in the 1950s and 1960s. Rongelap had been evacuated and resettled on two 
separate occasions after the tests and, despite assurances that the land is safe for 
reoccupation, only small handfuls of Marshallese have returned to reside full time. The U.S. 
position on the atoll is that all appropriate compensation and measures of recourse have been 
served through the COFA and other U.S. Mid-2018, a group consisting of RMI’s former 
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president Kessai Note, parliamentary speaker Kenneth Kedi, Rongelap mayor James 
Matayoshi, and Chinese-Marshallese businessman Cary Yan submitted a proposal to turn 
Rongelap Atoll into an Special Administration Region (RASAR).316 Shortly after President 
Heine’s government rejected the proposal over concerns that the RASAR could be 
vulnerable to money laundering scams, former president Note called for a no-confidence 
vote to remove President Heine from office citing the administrations negative publicity 
over the creation of a national cryptocurrency. President Heine’s own assertions that  
the RASAR was more central to her opposition’s schemes, that it represented Chinese 
interests, and that it that threatened geopolitics and national sovereignty all have fueled 
speculation since.  
Any evidence that supports President Hein’s claims against her opponents has 
become highly convoluted in speculation given the high-profile nature of the issue. James 
Matayoshi has served as the Mayor of Rongelap since 1995 and has famously been a lifelong 
advocate for the atoll and Marshallese people impacted by nuclear testing. Outside of tacit 
support for the RASAR there is no indication that Mr. Matayoshi has connections to any 
Chinese economic or political efforts. The fact that Mr. Yan is Chinese has made him an 
easy target of discriminatory reporting as many sources omit the fact that he is also a 
Marshallese citizen. Mr. Yan has leased lands in Rongelap and travelled to Hong Kong 
seeking potential investors to support his plan to open Rongelap as a Chinese re-export base, 
but all references to the scheme having political designs stem from speculations regarding a 
period when the RMI hosted embassies of both the PRC and Taiwan which enabled other 
Marshallese officials to grant passports to Chinese citizens in the 1990s.317  While the 
Rongelap atoll case has obvious implications for U.S. security and is certainly being 
monitored, open source research does not reflect the same degree of state-based measures 
of competition as the other four cases.  
 
316 Alan Boyd, “Chinese Money Unsettles Marshallese Politics,” Asia Times 14 November 2019. 
https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/11/article/chinese-money-unsettles-marshallese-politics/. 
317 Mackenzie, “Remote Marshall Islands Atoll Plans to Become the Next Hong Kong,” 2018. 
101 
D. CASE STUDY RESULTS AND CHINA’S APPROACH 
The five sub-national assessments conducted in this Chapter provides strong 
evidence for three of six initial hypotheses established for evaluating Chinese political, 
economic, and psychological statecraft in the Marshall Islands. The cases provide weak, yet 
positive evidence furthering the plausibility of two hypotheses and evidence suggesting, but 
not confirming, the studies central hypothesis pertaining to the existence of coordinated 
political warfare. Correlations between Chinese political objectives and economic 
dependency (H2) appear to be positive and significant as demonstrated to various degrees 
in four of the five cases. A comparison of economic versus political returns on investment 
provides mixed evidence for and against the notion that China’s economic engagements 
have more political viability than economic potential (H3). While evidence does support 
that Chinese ODA and FDI did increased over periods of tensions and negotiation with U.S. 
policy makers (H4), the cases and data may still be too broad and generalized to attribute 
significant meaning to the result as China’s engagement has grown rather significantly 
across the entire period assessed, thus leaving little room for period-based comparisons. 
Evidence provided through the assessed case studies is weakest for demonstrating targeted 
tangible support to groups denouncing United States policies (H5) and state-based 
misinformation campaigns (H6). Chuuk’s focus on alternative foreign investment and 
grievances toward the COFA suggest evidence for H5, but actual state support is 
speculative. Similar results are reached in the cases of ETG’s and Luen Thai’s promises to 
investments in Yap, where companies have leveraged inducements to secure land leases 
with a lack of follow-through for development, but instances of misinformation can only be 
attributed to the companies themselves rather than state backers. Finally, several gaps still 
exist to make a strong case supporting the studies primary hypothesis, that the CCP is 
leveraging coercive diplomatic, economic, and psychological statecraft in concerted 
campaigns to weaken COFA agreements and U.S. security (H1). While evidence supports 
different components of this hypothesis across the case studies, only the Chuuk case 
provides any evidence suggesting coordinated efforts aimed at the COFA, which as 
described, lacks concrete proof. 
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Figure 28. Chinese Trade Strategies 
H2: China’s political objectives in the central Pacific grow more assertive and antithetical 
to American interests as countries become more dependent on Chinese trade and capital 
flows. 
Correlations between Chinese political objectives and economic dependency  
appear to be both positive and significant from a qualitative standpoint as demonstrated 
through economic coercion to shape Palau’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan, SOE-based 
efforts to secure resources and potentially secure greater political influence in the RMI, 
efforts of state-affiliated enterprises to exchange economic development for access and 
control of lands in Yap, and strong, albeit inconclusive, indications of direct inducements to 
the Chuukese successionists encouraging the separation from the Federated States and 




H3: China’s economic engagements in Micronesia have limited potential for economic 
return, but notable capacity for political opportunity and leverage.  
Reporting from local fisheries managers regarding the lack of concern that the Pan 
Pacific processing plant in Majuro only operates at one-fifth capacity provides telling 
example of financial investments for less-than purely economic reasons. Granting that 
partnership with the plant also provide the economic benefit of greater access to Marshallese 
fisheries at lower costs to Shanghai Kaichuang vessels, given that multiple SOEs reportedly 
spend billions in government subsidies to acquire lands for more facilities across 
Micronesia, decisions to not operate existing facilities at higher capacity seem to contradict 
economic interests as a driving motivation. Fisheries managers also report Chinese tuna 
fishing crews as being agnostic to the cost of fishing days when this particular operating cost 
acts as the primary driver causing American tuna companies to sell off fleets and leave the 
business.318  As for political opportunity and leverage, evidence is not readily apparent at 
this time; however, monopolization of WPCO fishing and the leasing of lands for 
infrastructure certainly creates voting power in fishing-based island nations. According to 
local monitors and technical assistance experts within the WPCO, financial cooperation and 
cross-investment between Taiwan and China’s fishing sector “has occurred for some time 
and will continue,” while the Chinese Government has simultaneously been seeking  to  
encourage  PICs  to  break  diplomatic  ties  with  Taiwan in favor of stronger economic 
relationships with the PRC.319  
 
H4: China’s foreign engagement and volume of public diplomacy within Micronesia 
increases during periods of political dispute with the United States. 
Evidence demonstrating the increase of Chinese ODA and FDI during periods of 
disagreement cannot be separated from other factors well enough to be considered 
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significant; however, one particularly interesting correlation is the overlap of the formation 
of Chuuk’s Independence Commission with the decision of the USDOI’s JEMCO to freeze 
funding for infrastructure given that the COFA weighed so prominently in CSPSC’s 
recommendations for secession.  
 
H5: China increases tangible support to local actors who take outspoken positions against 
U.S. policies. 
Local reporting reflects consistent accounts of mutual beneficial connections 
between local business, PRC politics, and local officials within Yap, Chuuk, and Palau; 
however, information collected within this study cannot substantiate that the CCP is actively 
supporting or encouraging individuals who take positions against U.S. interests in 
Micronesia.  
 
H6: The CCP utilizes misinformation to obscure its strategic intentions and activities in 
Micronesia. 
Since 2011 large SOEs ETG an Luen Thai have entered into agreements with state 
officials in Yap promising valuable economic development and securing lands for Chinese 
developers. Luen Thai has gone so far as to publicize agreements for the development of 
shore-based fishing infrastructure, but state officials report that these companies routinely 
fail to produce business plans required for actual development to occur. It is unclear exactly 
how pervasive the practice of securing land and not flowing through with promised 
development has been over in recent years, but senior level officials and ambassadors have 
highlighted the economic prospects of China’s massive tourism market for over a decade; 
however, the only country within this study that experienced any notable influx of Chinese 
tourism did not receive significant support in capacity building for that sector and 




H1: The CCP leverages coercive diplomatic, economic, and psychological statecraft in 
concerted campaigns to weaken Compacts of Free Association agreements between the 
U.S., Palau, FSM, and RMI. 
Collective assessments of the other five hypotheses and indicators comprising the 
threshold of political warfare are assessed collectively in order to assess this hypothesis. 
First, political warfare demands that statecraft is used affect either political composition or 
decision making. While each case has only led to a suggestion of such activities economic 
coercion in Palau would satisfy the requirement for decision making while economic 
inducements made to secessionists in Chuuk would constitute both an intent to shape 
decision making as well as the political composition of the federation. The second indicator 
describes a deliberate policy to achieve political objectives. The most definitive and explicit 
evidence for this criterion is the State Council’s citing of its One China principle as 
justification of economic sanctions enforced against Palau although the PRC denies that the 
sanctions were deliberately premeditated for the purpose of inducing political change. 
Statecraft employed in other instances could serve a range of political objectives ranging 
from food and resource security to offshore defense; however, the PRC only states only 
refers to its development initiatives in Oceania in the broad terms of strategic partnerships 
and overseas interests which elude the prospect of definitively tying action to policy. 
Finally, the third criteria demand that the deliberate policy choice undermines a rival. In the 
case of Palau, the rival being undermined is Taiwan and the study could definitively 
conclude that the PRC is conducting political warfare against Taiwan and, by some 
extension, American interests and values; however, the intended purpose of the research is 
to consider the PRCs actions against the Compact arrangements and security arrangements 
specifically. In this regard China’s political warfare effort can only be determined as 
plausible and would depend on how the CCP leverages the advantages in physical 
positioning and political access gained through SOEs after U.S. compact funding concludes 
in 2024 and Compact states experience a significant change in economic dependencies. 
The PRC is acquiring control of physical space in the Central Pacific through the 
leveraging of state-owned enterprises and inducements of economic development in local 
fishing and tourism industries to secure local land-use and access agreements. It is unlikely 
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that the PRC will pursue militarization of lands in Micronesia over the short-term to any 
extent reflecting current militarization taking place in the SCS. It is however likely that these 
positions will assist in the installation of local intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance 
efforts, as well as provide options for gradual escalations in “active defense” capabilities if 
the CCP could justify being provoked enough to take active measures. Such escalation 
would not have to achieve a physical foreclosure of U.S. capabilities, but only psychological 
foreclosure to the extent that the U.S. interests become divided and impotent over the 
prospects of growing risks and costs in the Central Pacific relative to the public perceptions 
of benefits for maintaining force projection further west. 
E. ALTERNATIVE ENDS, WAYS, MEANS AND RISK ASSESSMENTS  
The CCP’s own stated foreign policy goals of bolstering development and 
establishing multinational cooperative platforms to ensure long-term peace and stability 
through political and diplomatic means reflects what Friedberg described as the “optimist-
constructivist” perspective on U.S.-China relations.320 China’s increased diplomatic and 
economic engagement with the FSM along with a strong willingness to support the 
vulnerable nation’s economic security at levels similar to other donors after 2024, serves as 
general base of evidence for stability-focused policy. Evidence of a cooperative approach to 
these ends exist in the establishment of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic 
Development and Cooperation forum, which held its third forum in October 2019, and has 
facilitated direct coordination between select Pacific Island nations and a large network of 
development sector entrepreneurs. One issue with the constructivist perspective is that 
China sanctions against PIC governments that don’t recognize its legitimate authority are 
barred from entry until their political leanings change. Other issues include China’s 
avoidance to work with and through established multilateral institutions and eschew 
cooperative efforts with partners such as Australia and New Zealand on the premise that, as 
a developing country, China and its partners must work independently on direct “south-to-
south” development agendas. Foreign engagement through the Export Import Bank of 
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China, AIIB, and overseas Chinese “bridges of communication” all undermine established 
norms as the grass-roots nature of this approach runs counter to the general practice of 
working by, with, and through national channels.321 To explain further, bilateral donors and 
supporters more generally engage with national entities as opposed to state governments in 
order to bolster the development, legitimacy, and accountability of federal agencies; China’s 
facilitation of SOEs engaging with state and local governments undermines these principles. 
Liberal pessimist perspectives certainly provide plausible explanations and insights 
regarding Chinese economic investments in the fishing and tourism. In the case of Palau, it 
very well may be that Chinese business prior to 2017 had simply found a new market for 
mutually beneficial economic exchange and that the government’s own authoritarian 
insecurities derailed an otherwise free market endeavor. Palau (and Yap) sit only four hours 
from China by plane, and both make for ideal investment options given the Chinese public’s 
growing demand for tourism, and ETG’s identification of Yap as a potential conference 
destination is also plausible along similar logic. Outside of the reporting on local accounts 
there is no evidence that Beijing’s actions to sanction Palau had been premeditated and very 
well could have occurred as a consequence of enforcing state policies more generally. In the 
case of the fishing investments China’s SOEs are providing new mechanisms for longer-
term food security while providing economic benefit to host communities and thus 
satisfying China’s grass-roots development and “mutual benefit” agendas.  
While narrow evidence within the case studies of this research supports the 
plausibility of optimist-constructivist and pessimist-liberal explanations of China’s foreign 
relations it is important to look at each of these assessments against broader contexts of 
China’s foreign engagements. While ETG may be seeking economic returns on the 
construction of massive infrastructure in Yap, it is difficult to discount both Yap and ETGs 
project in Tibet both create similar political implications in regions representing the fringe 
of Chinese influence. During the later stages of this research both the Solomon Islands 
exchanged their respective diplomatic relations with Taipei for Beijing and Kiribati’s 
economy has been far more driven by its fishing industry than any other PIC in recent years.  
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This study has sought to assess what Chinese activities in the Central Pacific over 
the past 30 years indicates with regards to the CCP’s strategy for displacing United States 
positions and influence within the Indo-Pacific theater. The research assessed the strategic 
interests, foreign policies and economic engagements of the United States, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, as well as the ends, ways, and means available to 
the CCP in gaining relative positions of power and influence while avoiding the risks of 
eliciting resolute responses or escalations of conflict.  
From a regional perspective, intergovernmental ministries and frameworks have 
assumed larger roles in guiding and collectivizing the interests of individual Pacific Island 
nations, and most states are increasingly reinforcing these bonds due to the tangible value 
and security that regionalization is providing; however, even after accounting for increased 
revenue levels projected under prominent IGO “opportunity scenario” assessments, funding 
to sustain public sector growth and governance will likely require continued contributions 
from bilateral and multilateral foreign assistance. The PRC has moved into this space as a 
prominent bilateral partner for several Pacific Island Countries. This study reveals that 
several prominent reports currently shaping policy discussion on U.S. interests have grossly 
overestimated and routinely mischaracterize China’s total economic engagement with the 
region. Billions of dollars that pass through foreign companies domiciled in the Marshall 
Islands have been determined as China’s trade “with” Pacific Island Countries leading to 
assessments that position the PRC in a relatively more central economic position with the 
region than it truly is. Assessments of the PRCs current and future leverage over Palau also 
tend toward overstating that nation’s vulnerabilities to future economic coercion. Regarding 
the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, reporting seems to 
underappreciate the degree by which Chinese SOEs have leveraged positive economic tools 
of statecraft on behalf of CCP interests. 
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Sub-national assessment suggests that rather than exercising statecraft centrally or 
at an executive level, Beijing relies on passive signals, societal pressures, and informal 
networks to create internal pressures on local governments to move toward desirable policy 
outcomes. Prospects of economic insecurity tied to the setting of U.S. Compact funding 
exacerbates internal frictions with RMI and FSM specifically, as both will continue to rely 
on remittances and ODA for economic security for their respective plannable futures. RMI’s 
more optimistic Compact Trust Fund scenario, shrinking debt burden, and injection of 
grants from non-governmental sources all help in bringing the country closer to its economic 
security goals; however, the lack of domestic opportunities for industry drives greater 
reliance on fishing as well as political infighting over generating creative schemes for 
economic development. FSM has been and will continue to be at a higher risk of political 
influence from external actors in general compared to the other Compact nations due to more 
pronounced fiscal problems leading into 2024. Economic insecurity in FSM also impacts 
the political security of its individual states to a degree that is potentially forcing Chuuk to 
leave the federation, and assessment of the leading secessionists in Chuuk demonstrate 
aspirations to align with Beijing if not outright sponsored subversion.  
Having observed where reliance, vulnerabilities and opportunities lie within 
Micronesia in recent years lie, China is currently shaping the local pollical and economic 
environment by heavily sponsoring increased Chinese positions in local fishing industries; 
displacing Taiwanese, Japanese, and U.S. tuna companies; and assuming strategic 
relationships as an economic security provider. The PRC has also sought to leverage 
economic development in tourism as a both a carrot and stick for shaping the environment 
in Micronesia; however, these efforts seem to have taken a back-seat either because the 
economic inducements have already achieved the intended goal of securing land leases to 
the fullest extent feasible before local push-back, because slowdowns in China’s economic 
engines have made economic development through tourism too costly and risky of an 
economic investment, or some combination thereof.  
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B. IMPLICATIONS 
China is positioning itself to be the strategic partner, through irregular means and 
outside of official government channels. Evidence gathered supports the notion that China 
used its growing position in regional fishing to shift Kiribati’s diplomatic recognition of 
Taiwan to the PRC, and suggests that similar outcomes of political shaping could be 
achieved in the Marshall islands as relative dependence on fishing increases and other, 
balancing bilateral partners reduce their respective positions with that industry space.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on findings throughout this assessment, subsequent research should assess on 
China’s engagements with Kiribati and focus attention on the fungibility of investments and 
informal relationships to the political influence that ultimately tipped the country away from 
Taiwan and into Beijing’s sphere of influence. Studies should also look at land lease and 
development agreements secured within Kiribati given its proximity to U.S. positions in 
Micronesia. Assessments of land lease agreements for the region would also provide useful 
special and temporal information, while conducting a network analysis of Chinese fishing 
and development corporations might provide greater insight into coordinated shaping 
operations. Finally, this study did not move the ball very far in terms of understanding 
influence and messaging efforts at the local, grassroots level that many of the PRC’s state-
run develop efforts focus on. Open source information on these small and sparsely populated 
areas can be highly reductive and contain large amounts of unhelpful bias, which makes 
understanding local information and is impacts difficult. First-hand analysis of local 
information environments, narratives, and surveys of local perspectives would pay huge 
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APPENDIX. A.  EXCERPTS ON MAJOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EVENTS  
SHAPING MARSHALLESE INTERESTS 















US Congress ratifies Compact of Free 
Association. 
 
FSM enters a Compact of Free Association 
(Compact) with the United States 
“FSM receives  




resident immigrant status. 
Right to live and work in the 
United States. 
 
FSM has full control over all 
aspects of domestic and 
foreign policy, with the 
exception of defense and 
security issues” 
CIA World Factbook. 









The Amended Compact of Free Association 
(Amended Compact), comes into effect 
“The U.S. government 
appropriates  
$1.8 billion in funding to 
FSM over twenty years to  
include contributions to a 







FSM Establishes Diplomatic Relations with PRC  
FSM Department of 









Renegotiation of Compact of Free Association 
with U.S.  
About the Compacts of 






Amended Compact (Compact-II) comes into 
effect   
About the Compacts of 






“FSM spends $56 of $76 million available COFA 
grant funds due to failures to adjust to new 
implementation rules” 
 
FSM 2023 Planning 
Committee. Draft 2023 




“JEMCO requires 30% floor on Compact grant 
spending towards infrastructure”  
FSM 2023 Planning 
Committee. Draft 2023 













FSM passes corporate tax regulations 
 
Enables the creation of an 
overseas domicile. Increased 
tax revenues from Japanese 
Corporations. 
Graduate School USA. 
2019. Economic Brief: 





JICA funds large infrastructure projects linked to 
airport renovations and other grant funded 
construction 
Economic growth  
FSM OBEM. 2018. 





“US Department of Interior freezes infrastructure 
grants until updated development plan is 
published” 
“led to a decline in 
construction activity.” 26 
percent in FY2013, 41 








“Significant decline in construction activity” 
leads to recession.  Economy contracts 8 percent 
Graduate School USA. 
2019. Economic Brief: 




“FSM holds a Development Partners Meeting 
with the purpose of accelerating implementation 
of the SDP and seeking development partner 
support across four broad areas: Agriculture, 
fisheries, tourism, energy.” 
“A second Development 
Partners meeting is scheduled 
for 2016 where development 
partners will be invited to 









“The economic impact of the decision to freeze 
infrastructure grants is severely felt”  
FSM 2023 Planning 
Committee. Draft 2023 




“15 percent decline in domestic fisheries” 
“the worst period of 
economic performance since 









Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) policy 
was approved by Congress. 
“The purpose of the policy is to establish 
approaches to managing ODA such that benefits 
are maximized for all stakeholders. The policy 
acknowledges, recognizes and respects the 
“coordination with non-US 
bilateral development 







unique circumstances of each state but also seeks 
commonalities across FSM.” 
F17 
2014 
FSM Planning Committee releases Draft 2023 
FSM Action Plan 
Initial strategy for 
approaching the 2024 “Fiscal 
Gap” and a precursor to the 
Infrastructure Development 
Plan 
FSM 2013 Planning 
Committee. Draft 2023 
Action Plan. Palikir: 
Government of the 









FSM Department of Transportation, 
Communications, and Infrastructure (FSM 
DoTCI) Publishes Infrastructure Development 
Plan 
National strategy required to 







$111.3 million in unallocated Amended Compact 
infrastructure funds. 
“Obtaining the release of 
these funds is critical to 
restoring construction 
activity and getting GDP out 








Economic growth across all economic sectors.  
Annual average growth = 3.4%  
FSM OBEM. 2018. 




A resolution between the U.S. and the FSM 
removes the suspension of infrastructure grant 
funding 
 
U.S. DOI. FSM and U.S. 
Officials Lift Suspension 













Typhoon Wutip  States of emergency for Chuuk and Yap 
Relief Web. IOM 
Micronesia Newsletter, 












Referendum on the Independence of Chuuk 
postponed to 2020 
 









APPENDIX. B.  EXCERPTS ON MAJOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EVENTS  
SHAPING MICRONESIAN INTERESTS 
 Date Event or Policy Impact or Interest Source 
R1 1986 US Congress ratifies Compact of Free 
Association. 
Marshall Islands attains independence.  
Compact of Free Association with the United 
States comes into effect.  
“The Marshall Islands 
received roughly $1 billion in 




resident immigrant status. 
Right to live and work in the 
United States. 
 
The U.S. keeps its military 
base on Kwajalein Atoll.” 
CIA World Factbook. 
2019. “Marshall Islands.”   
 
 
R2 1990   





RMI a full member to the 
United Nations in 1991. 
 
BBC. 2018. “Marshall 




R3 1990 - 
1998 
FSM establishes Diplomatic Relations with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
 
 
BBC. 2018. “Marshall 
Islands profile - 
Timeline”   
R4 1998 - FSM ends diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
Establishes diplomatic relations with Republic of 
China (Taiwan)  
 
 
BBC. 2018. “Marshall 
Islands profile - 
Timeline”   
R5 1999 RMI Officials attend the first National Economic 
and Social Summit  
Recommendations from the 
NESS “compel RMI to 
World Summit on 
Sustainable 
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establish the National 







Renegotiation of Compacts of Free Association 
with the United States. 
 
Amended Compact comes into effect for twenty 
years beginning in 2004. 
Marshall Islands will receive 
roughly $1.5 billion in direct 
U.S. assistance 
 
The U.S. and Marshall Islands 
also jointly funding a trust 
fund for the that will provide 
an income stream beyond 
2024 






R7 2004 RMI enters into agreement with shipping 
registries 
“Creates mechanism for ship 
registry and shipping 
royalties, now a significant 
source of income” 
Graduate School USA. 
2018. “Economic 








Loss of 400 jobs. Contributes 
to economic stagnation. 
 
Graduate School USA. 
2018. “Economic 






Increases in Foreign Direct Investments 
associated with fish-processing plant 
 
Aids economic recovery. 
 
 
Graduate School USA. 
2018. “Economic 






Global Financial Crisis.  
 
RMI’s economy shrinks by 
2.4%  
 
Graduate School USA. 
2018. “Economic 




2008 Flooding in Majuro and Ebeye.  
President Declares State of 
Emergency  
BBC. 2018. “Marshall 





Implementation of Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) 
for purse seine fishing vessels  
 
Annual revenues for fishing 
licenses increase from $7.9 to 
$40 million by 2017 
 
Graduate School USA. 
2018. “Economic 





“RMI Ministry of Foreign Affairs Presents 
Vision 2018 to the Third International 
Conference.  
Goal 1- Operating in an interdependent world; 
Goal 2- Enhanced Socio-Economic Self 
Reliance; Goal 3- An Educated People; Goal 4- A 
Healthy People; Goal 5- A Productive People; 
Goal 6- A Law Abiding People; Goal 7- A God 
Loving People; Goal 8—Respecting Individual 
Freedom and Fundamental Human Rights; Goal 
9—Respecting Culture and Traditions;  
Goal 10—Environmental Sustainability” 
RMIs national set of strategic 
principles. 
Republic of the Marshall 
Islands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 2013. 
“Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (RMI): National 









Signing of Majuro Declaration to combat climate 
change   





IMF designates RMI as high risk of debt distress.  
External Debt burden over 50% of GDP 
 
RMI financing for 
development projects limited 
to “grants only” 
IMF. 2013. Republic of 





Flooding in Majuro and Ebeye. State of 
Emergency   
BBC. 2018. “Marshall 




2014 Marshall Island sues for nuclear disarmament 
International Court of Justice 
declares a lack of jurisdiction 
and drops suit in 2016 
BBC. 2018. “Marshall 







RMI Publishes National Strategic Plan 2015–
2017 
Establishes Priority 
Development Goals “as the 
RMI moves towards the 
scheduled completion of The 
Compact of Free Association 
in 2023” 
RMI and USDoI. 
“Economic Review: RMI 





“Fishing royalties drive economic growth. 
Fishing-based revenues increase from $7.9 to $40 
million” Economy grows 6.5%.  
Graduate School USA. 
2018. “Economic 
Review: RMI Fiscal Year 
2017.” p.44. 
R20 Jan. 




2017 Fisheries Receipts help spur economic recovery 
External debt burden falls to 
35% of GDP 
Graduate School USA. 
2018. “Economic 




Members of government propose Special 
Administration Region (SRA) in Rongelap Atoll  
Radio New Zealand. 
2018. “Remote Islands 








RMI legislature passes law declaring SOV 




SOV Foundation. 2019. 
https://sov.foundation/ 
Bloomberg. 2019. “Tiny 
Pacific Nation Makes a 





No Confidence vote by the Nitijela (parliament).  
16 of 33 votes cast for removal. 
 
Heine retains presidency by 1 
vote  
 
SCMP. 2018. “Marshall 
Islands leader survives 
no-confidence motion” 
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APPENDIX. C.  EXCERPTS ON MAJOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EVENTS  
SHAPING PALAUAN INTERESTS 
ID Date Event or Policy Impact or Interest Source 
P1 Oct. 
1994 
The Republic of Palau becomes an independent 
nation in Free Association with the United States 
of America. 
Political and economic ties to 
the West. 
U.S. DOS. 2012.The 
Continued Free 
Association with the 






Palau signed the Compact Review Agreement 
(CRA) with the US. Tourism bolters the economy 
FSM OBEM. 2018. 




Palau requests technical support from USDoI to 
develop a master tourism plan. 
The nation has adopted a 
“Pristine, Paradise. Palau 
brand and a policy to attract 
high-value tourism” 
Graduate School USA. 
2019. Economic Review 






Washington, DC, : DoI 





Palau, with technical  assistance from the ADB, 
“publishes a Medium-Term Strategy for 
Sustainable  Economic Development” 
Tourism growth stresses 
infrastructure 
Government of Palau and 
Asia Development Bank. 









Palau recognized as the “World’s Most 
Sustainable Travel Destination” from the 
Internationale Tourismus-Börse in Berlin 
Economic 
Remengesau, Tommy 
2019. “State of the 
Republic Address.”  p.11. 
P6 
2018 
Economy grows by 1.7% “driven primarily by 
the public sector infrastructure projects.” 
Total average wage and 
salary levels increased by 2.1 
percent from $11,125 in 
FY2017 to $11,365. 
Remengesau, Tommy E. 
2019. “State of the 











2019  President Tsi Ing-wen (ROC), visits Palau 
Diplomatic ties 
Taiwan Today. President 
Tsai to visit Palau, Nauru, 







APPENDIX. D.  READERS’ GUIDE TO EXCERPTS ON  
CHINESE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL EVENTS SHAPING THE SOUTH PACIFIC 




The People’s Republic of China (PRC) joined the 
United Nations  
 
Replaces the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) as the 
international representative 
of the Chinese nation.  
Why did Resolution 2758 
recognize the P.R.C 
government as the sole 
legitimate government 
representing China in the 
UN? Permanent Mission 







Then-CCP leader Deng Xiaoping announces 
China’s policy to reform and open up to political 
and economic engagement.  
 
 Jacques Delisle and 
Avery Goldstein, China’s 
Economic Reform and 








PRC signs the Joint Communique on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and 
establishes diplomatic relations with the US 
United States recognizes 
PRC as the legal government 
of China. 
Outlines intentions to reduce 
the “dangers of military 
USDOS. Joint 
Communique on the 
Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations 
between the United States 
of America and the 
125 
 
conflict and oppose regional 
hegemony.” 
 
People’s Republic of 
China, January 1, 1979.  
C4  
1993 
PRC sets up the Foreign Aid Fund for Joint 
Ventures and Cooperative Projects  
State-sponsored policy to 
SOEs in building and 
expanding joint ventures with 
recipient countries  
PRC State Council, 
China’s Foreign Aid, 







Chinas founds the Export-Import Bank of China Increases foreign aid through 
medium- and long-term low-
interest loans to developing 
countries 
PRC State Council, 




China joins the WTO and asserts its “Going Out” 
Policy (Now Going Global 1.0) 
Going Global 1.0 provided a 
guide for SOEs to find 
resources and markets 
offshore. 
China Policy, Going 
Global: between 





China increases its financial resource for foreign 
aid  
ODA increased 29.4% on 
average per year 
PRC State Council, 




Global Financial Crisis   
C9 2010 State Council Publishes white paper on China’s 
National Defense in 2010 
Outlines the National 
Defense Policy and the 
modernization of the 
People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) in the “new era” 
PRC State Council, 
China’s National Defense 
in 2010.  
C10 
2010 State Council Publishes China’s Foreign Aid 
Outlines China’s foreign aid 
policy, funding, distribution, 









     
C11 Nov. 
2011 
PRC Publishes white paper on China’s Policies 
and Actions for Addressing Climate Change  
Outlines the PRCs policies 
and for mitigating climate 
change, adapting to climate 
change, and participating in 
international cooperation. 
Calls for funding and 
technology transfers to 
developing countries 
PRC State Council, 
China’s Policies and 
Actions for Addressing 





State Council Publishes white paper on China’s 
Foreign Trade policy  
Outlines reforms to China’s 
Trade policies, contributions 
to the world economy, and 
proposals for a “new 
international economic and 
trade order”  
PRC State Council, 
China’s Foreign Trade, 
2011. 
     
C13 
2012 
China Commissions first Aircraft Carrier 
Liaoning  
China Power Team. 
“How does China’s first 
aircraft carrier stack up?” 
China Power. December 
9, 2015. Updated October 
11, 2019. Accessed 








CCP Chairman Xi Jinping announces China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
BRI projects accounting for 
51.6 percent of the total value 
of foreign contracts. Chinese 
firms invest US$14.35 bn in 
the real economies of 53 Belt 
and Road states and sign 
8,158 project contracts worth 
$126.03 bn in 2016,  
China Power Team. 
“How will the Belt and 
Road Initiative advance 
China’s interests?” China 
Power. May 8, 2017. 
Updated October 18, 
2019. Accessed 







State Council publishes white paper on China’s 
Foreign Aid policy 
Outlines China’s policies for 
promoting “economic and 
social development and 
participation in international 
exchanges and cooperation 
mechanisms”  
PRC State Council, 





China founds the Asia Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) 
Most PRC infrastructure 
loans still come from Exim 
Bank of China and China 
Development Bank 
China Policy, Going 
Global: between 





State Council publishes white paper on China’s 
Military Strategy 
Outlines the development, 
missions, and strategic tasks 
of the armed forces. 
Provides strategic guidance 
for “Active Defense” 





China launches Capacity Cooperation  
Smaller BRI-like program 
focused on Europe and South 
America 
China Policy, Going 
Global: between 







Local authorities confiscate the Chinese 
research/survey vessel Xiang Yang Hong 19 
within the EEZ of Yap, FSM 
Exacerbates U.S. concerns of 
Chinese maritime surveys for 
dual-use (civilian and 








State Council publishes white paper on China’s 
Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation  
Outlines China’s policies, 
positions, and vision for 
regional security and security 
cooperation 
PRC State Council and 
Information Office, 2017. 
C21 
2017 
China establishes first overseas military base in 
Djibouti  
China Formally Opens 
First Overseas Military 









China Pledges $4bn USD in aid to the Pacific; 
largest commitments include PNG ($3.9 bn), 
Tonga ($24.5 million), and Vanuatu ($11.1 
million) 
 
Pledge fulfillment would 
potentially make the PRC the 
largest aid donor in the 
region.  
Huge Increase in Chinese 
Aid Pledged to the 








“The PLAN hospital ship Ark Peace sailed over 
30,000 nautical miles for the tasks of Mission 
Harmony in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, 
Tonga and 8 nations across South America and 
the Caribbean.” 
Diagnosed and treated 50,884 
people, performed 288 
surgical operations across the 
South Pacific and South 
America  
State Council and 
Information Office of the 














China Publishes white paper on China’s National 
Defense in the New Era 
 
 
“China’s National Defense 
Aims: 
• deter and resist 
aggression;  
• safeguard national 
political security and 
social stability;  
• Oppose and contain 
“Taiwan independence”;  
• crack down on 
proponents of separatist 
movements  
• safeguard national 
sovereignty, unity, and 
territorial integrity  
• safeguard China’s 
maritime rights and 
interests;  
• safeguard China’s 
security interests in outer 
PRC State Council, 
China’s National Defense 
in the New Era, (Beijing : 












space and cyberspace;  
• safeguard China’s 
overseas interests 
• support the sustainable 




APPENDIX. E.  READERS’ GUIDE TO EXCERPTS ON  
CHINESE ENGAGEMENT WITH FSM, PALAU, RMI, AND CNMI 





Local Impact Source 
1 2009 Bridge Project Feasibility Study   
Sichuan Road and Bridge Cooperation                 
Okat Bridge, Kosrae  
 
D-PRC-




Infrastructure  AidData. 2017 China’s 
Global Chinese Official 




2 2009 “In 2009 an agreement was signed between FSM and 
China for the funding and implementation of a bridge 
in Kosrae. The project was approved in 2011 and China 
also funded a feasibility study worth 450,000 RMB 
(see project #40001). The total cost of this project was 
13 million USD. For the project, China provided 60 
million RMB in grants, approved by FSM Congress in 
2014. In October 2014, Sichuan Road & Bridge 
Construction began implementation of the project, with 
completion scheduled for April 2016. The bridge, also 
known as Kosrae Bridge or Okat Bridge, will have a 
length of 96.2m and a width of 9.5m. In August 2015, 
China railway 17th Bureau Group implemented a mid-
term quality inspection of the project. The assessment 
concluded that the project met acceptance criteria.”                                         
D-PRC-





3 2009 “Zhejiang Province, China engineers implement 
installation of biogas stoves in Chuuk and Pohnpei” 
D-PRC-













Local Impact Source 
P-Strategic 
Partnership 
4 2009 “In 2009, China provided a $1 million grant to 
Micronesia for the refurbishment and repair of a naval 
ship in Chuuk, the MS Chief Mailo” 
D-PRC-





5 2008 “China pledges to construct nine temporary classrooms 
in Micronesia Unspecified Chinese Government 
Institution.”                                 
D-PRC-
Funded   
E-Grant Aid 
Education AidData 
6 2006 “The Chinese government aided FSM leaders in 
building four residence projects. The handover 
ceremony was held in Pohnpei, FSM. FSM President 
Urusemal and VP Killion were among the heads of 
state who attended the handover ceremony”                      
D-PRC-





7 2009 “In 2009 the Chinese Embassy in Micronesia reported 
the proposal of a project design and concessional loan 
from China’s Exim Bank to the Federated States of 
Micronesia for the establishment of fish processing 
plants at Micronesia’s main ports. The value of this 
loan would be $22 million USD, with a 5-year grace 
period and a 20-year term. In 2010 FSM’s congress 
voted to allow the President to enter negotiations over 
the loan. There is no evidence that the loan was 








8 2006 “In October 2006, the government of China and 
Micronesia signed an agreement to build a government 
office building to the state of Pohnpei. Construction 
started in February 2008 and was completed in January 
D-PRC-















Local Impact Source 
2010. The Chinese government funded the project, 
which cost approximately 30 million RMB.”                                 
9 2009 “In January 2010 China granted office supplies to FSM 
Congress. The value of this donation was 500,000 
RMB” 
D-PRC-






10 2009 “In 2009, the Chinese government dispatched two 
medical teams to Micronesia, addressing urgent need 
for medicines and surgery as well as pediatric and 
gynecological care. In total, five doctors were sent, and 
all care provided was free of charge” 
D-PRC-







11 2008 “China loaned Micronesia 2 million USD for a 
construction of a high school in Kosrae. The project 




12 2007 “In February 2007, China agreed to construct a 
fisheries zone in Micronesia. The project consisted of 
maintaining a pilot vegetable farm project in 
Madolenihmw; developing a 28-boat tuna-fishing 
operation, Luen Thai from Hong Kong, which is based 
permanently in Pohnpei, that has plans to increase the 
number of fishing vessels to up to 40 next year.”  
D-PRC-








13 2007 “In August 2007 China reported that it would soon sign 
a lending agreement in which the EXIM bank would 
loan 2 million USD to the Federated States of 
Micronesia Development Bank at an annual interest of 
7%. The funding is for loans to Micronesian SMEs. 







14 2007 “In 2007 China pledged to provide Micronesia a 
concessional loan to support Chinese oil storage 
facilities and improve communications. The loan 




Infrastructure  AidData 
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Local Impact Source 
15 2007 “In 2007 China donated a cargo ship to Micronesia. 
The goal of the donation was to improve Micronesia’s 
transport and trade. The value of this donation is 
unknown” 
D-PRC-





16 2011 “The government of China provided agricultural 
science and vegetable gardening techniques to more 
than 300 students and teachers. Furthermore, Chinese 
officials donated vegetable seeds. This project is likely 
an extension of the Sino-Micronesia demonstration 
farm committed in 1998.” 
D-PRC-







17 2008 “In 2008 China committed a grant of 20 million RMB 
to the government of Micronesia for implementation of 
various economic and technical projects. The current 
state of this project is unknown.” 
D-PRC-








18 2008 “In 2008 the government of China granted Micronesia 
4 million RMB to be used for leasing a building to be 
used by the Micronesian embassy in China” 
D-PRC-








19 2005 “As part of three agreements signed between the 
governments of China and Micronesia, the Chinese 
government has pledged reconstruction assistance of 
the Chuuk International Airport in Micronesia. While 
the agreement was signed in 2005, later sources show 
that the project has been extremely delayed, and 
construction had not begun in 2009” 
D-PRC-












Local Impact Source 
20 2005 “The Chinese government constructed a Tuna 
Commission building in Micronesia to house the 
Micronesian delegation to the UN-facilitated and 
Chinese aided Western and Central Pacific Highly 
Migratory Fish Management committee. The building 
will be used for project management and 
development.”  
D-PRC-








21 2004 “In April 2004 China provided emergency relief aid 
after tropical storm Sudal hit Micronesia. The value of 
this aid is unknown.” 
D-PRC-







22 2002 “On November 27, 2002, China agreed to design and 
construct a stadium in Truk state, Micronesia.”  
D-PRC-




Infrastructure  AidData 
23 2006 “In 2006 a bilateral assignment between the Chinese 
government and the Federated States of Micronesia. As 
part of fulfilling the agreement a Chinese language 
instructor, Mr. Lu Shihua, arrived at the College of 
Micronesia, FSM in 2007. The total cost of the deal 
was $30000. Professor Lu Shihua spent a year at the 
college and taught Chinese language courses.”  
D-PRC-




24 2008 “In 2008, the Chinese government funded four full 
scholarships for Micronesian students to study at 
Chinese universities. The valued amount of the 
scholarships is $32,000 USD” 
D-PRC-











Local Impact Source 
25 2008 “In 2008 China gives $14k to Micronesia to buy 
computers for the FSM congress. No other information 
found. Source: AidData Global Finance Dataset” 
D-PRC-








26 2008 “In 2008 the Chuuk state government of Micronesia 
received $3.5 million USD from China in the form of a 
financial grant for its Financial Recovery Program. The 
funds come from a $4 million USD financial grant that 
the FSM received from the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China in July 2007.”  
D-PRC-








27 2008 “In 2008, China provided a $500,000 grant to 
Micronesia for financial reform” 
D-PRC-








28 2008 “On December 20, 2007, an agreement for a grant of 1 
million USD for the FSM Trust Fund was signed in 
Beijing by China’s Vice Minister for the Ministry of 
Commerce, Yu Guangzhou and by the FSM Secretary 
for the Department of Foreign Affairs, Lorin S. Robert. 
The funds were transferred and accepted on March 11, 
2008. During the same visit in December 2007, an 
Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation 
between the Federated States of Micronesia and the 
People’s Republic of China was signed as well. The 
20,000,000 RMB grant is to be used for the projects to 
be agreed upon between the two Governments. 
Specific matters in this regard will be stipulated in the 
D-PRC-















Local Impact Source 
subsequent agreements to be signed by the two 
countries” 
29 2009 “China gave $US 1 million grant for Kosrae coastal 
erosion” 
D-PRC-





30 2009 “In 2009, China gives $160,000 USD grant for Pohnpei 
government administration building furniture.”  
D-PRC-





31 2009 “In 2009, China pledged a $70,000 grant for the 
construction of a meeting house in Meerur, a village on 
Yap” 
D-PRC-





32 2009 “China gives $US 0.28m grant for Chuuk campus 
power generator, STAFF_NOTE: Academic Journal is 
not specific.” 
D-PRC-








33 2009 “In 2009, China gave a $US 0.22 million grant for the 
renovation of a tennis court and a swimming pool in 
the Pohnpei State of Micronesia.” 
D-PRC-





34 2009 “In 2009, China provided a $500,000 USD grant to 
Micronesia for a hospital in Chuuk.” 
D-PRC-












Local Impact Source 
P-Strategic 
Partnership 
35 2009 “In 2009, China granted Micronesia $0.14 million USD 
in scholarships.” 
D-PRC-





36 2005 “In 2005, China gave a $US 3.7 million economic and 
technical assistance grant to Micronesia” 
D-PRC-








37 2005 “In 2005, China provided Micronesia a $250,000 grant 
to purchase cars for protocol use” 
D-PRC-








38 2009 “Bi-lateral cooperation between China and FSM in the 
medical field began in 2009, with the “First Phase 
Medical Cooperation Project in Chuuk from August 
2009 to August 2011. The first medical team consisted 
of five medical doctors who served at the Chuuk State 
Hospital. The second phase medical cooperation 
project includes six doctors from China who are 
currently serving at the Pohnpei State Hospital. As part 
of this second phase, the PRC present over $130,000 
worth of medical equipment and supplies to the 
Pohnpei State Department of Health Services in 
December 2016” 
D-PRC-






Lowy Institute. 2019. 










Local Impact Source 
39 2010 “China originally donated 2 ships: Chief Mailo (2004) 
and Hapimohol 1 (2007). Both needed repair within a 
few years. China funded the repair of Chief Mailo in 
2010 and the repair of Hapimohol 1 in 2012. Repairs 
were undertaken by Wuhan Nanhua High Speed Ship 
Engineering Ltd, the company that originally supplied 
the ships. The agreement included towing the ship back 
to China, repairing and performing maintenance of the 
ship, delivering the repaired ship back to Micronesia, 
and training a local Micronesian crew” 
D-PRC-




Transportation Lowy Institute 
40 2010 “The Chinese Embassy has been working with FSM 
tourism authorities and tourism organizations in China 
to market the FSM as a tourist destination. In 2010, the 
China National Tourism Administration invited 
tourism officials from FSM to attend the 12th session 
of the China International Travel Mart. This is the 
largest international tourism fair in Asia and has served 
as an important platform for enhancing tourism 
exchanges between China and foreign countries.”  
D-PRC-




Tourism Lowy Institute 
41 2011 “As FSM’s compact for financial assistance from the 
U.S. nears its end (2023), the FSM Government has 
been happy to strengthen its relationship with China. 
Since 2000, China has invested hundreds of millions of 
dollars in developing its diplomatic relationship with 
FSM. These grants are either for the purpose of 
economic and technical cooperation or outright 
financial assistance and are used to finance the same 
sectors that the US–FSM Compact intended to address 
education, health, infrastructure, public sector capacity 
D-PRC-
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building, private sector development, and the 
environment. Some of the money from the grant has 
been deposited into a Trust Fund that will help support 
the FSM government after 2023. The most recent 
package of grants from China used for these purposes 
were approved in 2011:  1.3 million RMB for financial 
assistance; 20 million RMB for Economic and 
Technical Cooperation; and another 10 million RMB 
for Economic and Technical Cooperation” 
42 2012 “An outbreak of dengue fever in late 2011 in the State 
of Yap led to the health department requesting 
assistance to help respond. China responded with a 
donation in late February 2012. This was after the 
number of new cases had peaked in December” 
D-PRC-







43 2012 Emergency assistance—Dengue Fever outbreak second 
assistance in 2011 
D-PRC-







44 2013 “In September 2016, the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China gave the Government of FSM a 
grant to purchase a Y-12 aircraft. A previous 
agreement has been made that the Chinese company 
AVIC Harbin Aircraft Industry Group would build the 
aircraft. In November 2017, the completed Y-12 plane 
arrived in Yap. It will be used for cargo transport, 
rescue and medical services in Micronesia.” 
D-PRC-




Transportation Lowy Institute 
45 2014 “When President Christian visited China in 2017, he 
established a new sister province –state relationship 
with Hainan. As part of this relationship, Hainan made 
D-PRC-
Funded   
E-Grant Aid 
Education Lowy Institute 
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a commitment of 50 scholarships to be used by FSM 
within the next 5 years (10 scholarships/year) for FSM 
students to study in Hainan. The first batch of 10 




46 2014 “China funded the upgrade of the FSM-China 
Friendship Sports Centre for the 2014 Micronesian 
Games. The Centre was originally built by China 
Guangzhou International Economic and Technical 
Cooperation Company, between 1999–2002, at a cost 
of ‘a little over’ US$5 million. The renovation included 
a new electronic scoreboard, lights, sound system, and 
NBA-style backboards and shot clocks” 
D-PRC-




Infrastructure Lowy Institute 
47 2015 “Pacific Islands Forum Grant: Included in this grant is 
the provision of 15 vehicles and it can be used for other 
projects as agreed by the two governments.”  
D-PRC-




Transportation Lowy Institute 
48 2015 “Typhoon Maysak Assistance: Emergency 
humanitarian assistance provided in April 2015 
following Typhoon Mayask which hit FSM from 29 
March to 2 April” 
D-PRC-







49 2015 “Agriculture Pilot Farm: In 1996, China began an 
agricultural technical assistance project in Pohnpei 
with the construction of a pilot farm, conversing an 
area of 80,000 square meters. Half of it is designated 
for traditional local crops like sakau, yam, taro, banana 
and others. The other half to trialing agricultural 
D-PRC-
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products and methods. The farm is organic and has 
been up and running for almost 22 years. Five Chinese 
agriculturalists work with local counterparts to pass on 
new and appropriate methods of vegetable production. 
Hundreds of locals (likely over 1000) have received 
training. Grants, agricultural technicians and 
equipment have been provided on an ongoing basis by 
China to see the project through its numerous phases. A 
grant worth 14.2 million RMB was provided in 2015 to 
assist with its 10th phase” 
50 2017 “Madolenihmw-China Friendship Gymnasium: In 
March 2017, President Christian was flow to Beijing, 
He was flattered at the degree of formality with which 
his party was welcomed to China (including a military 
review and school children in traditional costume). The 
party was taken to see the tourist village Hainan, as an 
example of successful tourism—which could be 
implemented in FSM. President Christian met with 
President Xi as part of the trip and was encouraged to 
take an active part in the Belt and Road scheme. The 
meeting concluded with   a signing ceremony of an 
economic and technical agreement providing the FSM 
with 100 million RMB, as well as the forgiveness of an 
interest free loan that FSM had taken in 1993 for the 
construction of a multi-purpose gymnasium located at 
the College of Micronesia national campus, officially 
named the FSM-China Friendship Sports Center” 
D-PRC-




Infrastructure Lowy Institute 
51 2016 “China’s Ministry of Commerce committed to provide 
FSM with USD $5 million per year from 2017 to 
2025.” 
D-PRC-
Funded   
E-Grant Aid 
Infrastructure Lowy Institute 
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P-Strategic 
Partnership 
52 2016 “China’s Ministry of Commerce committed to provide 
FSM with an untied grant of $9.4 
 million USD scheduled for FY2016” 
D-PRC-




Infrastructure Lowy Institute 
53 2016 “In 2015, China provided a grant for the construction 
of Chuuk state’s Government complex. This building is 
still under construction.”  
D-PRC-




Infrastructure Lowy Institute 
54 2016 “Chuuk State Government Complex Construction 
effort. Related to item 53.”  
D-PRC-




Infrastructure Lowy Institute 
55 2016 “At the request of the FSM Government, the Chinese 
Embassy donated drought relief materials including sea 
water desalination equipment, generators, pumps, 
water tanks, canned goods, sacks of rice and bottled 
water. China chartered cargo planes to deliver these 
supplies to FSM. These supplies were delivered into 
Pohnpei for further distribution to affected areas at the 
discretion of the FSM Government” 
D-PRC-







56 2016 “In May 2016, a handover ceremony for a Garbage 
Truck and Solar Power Lights to Madolenihmw 
Municipal Government from the Chinese Government 
was held. The lights included ten solar power indoor 
lights and two solar streetlights. Mayor Ringlen said 
D-PRC-




Infrastructure Lowy Institute 
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the garbage truck would play an important role 
protecting environment and making people live with 
cleaner and safer condition” 
57 2017 “On September 15, H.E. Ambassador Li Jie attended 
the Handover Ceremony for the Pohnpei State and 






58 2016 “In September 2016, an agricultural product market 
was donated by China to Net Municipal Government. 
The market will play an important role in promoting 
local economic development and increasing farmers 
and fishermen’s income” 
D-PRC-








59 2017 “President Christian visits China: When President 
Christian visited China in 2017, he established a new 
sister province –state relationship with Hainan. As part 
of this relationship, Hainan made a commitment of 50 
scholarships to be used by FSM within the next 5 years 
(10 scholarships/year) for FSM students to study in 
Hainan. The first batch of 10 students from FSM 







60 2017 “In 2017 the FSM Government approved a grant from 
China to subsidies the newly launched airline between 
the FSM and Papua New Guinea. Port Moresby’s 
Jacksons Airport is the leading regional ‘hub’ for air 
travel in the Pacific and will provide a platform for 
tourists to fly to FSM. Air Niugini, a PNG air service 
provider, is running the service.” 
D-PRC-




Transportation Lowy Institute 
61 2017 “The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China 
donated three large boxes of books covering a wide 
range of subjects on China, from regional histories and 
P-Strategic 
Partnership 
Education Lowy Institute 
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explanations of their political system, to the Pohnpei 
Public Library.” 
62 2018 “In early 2018, a cash grant of US$ 45,000 was 
approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China to the FSM Department of 
Foreign Affairs.”  
D-PRC-




Political Lowy Institute 
63 2012 “Chinese owned Exhibition and Travel Group (ETG) 
firm signed various 99-year leases to build Chinese 
owned resort properties in Yap. To date, no 
construction has been started but the leases remain. 
ETG claims it has no ties to the Chinese Government. 
The owner of ETG, Deng Hong was incarcerated at a 
Chinese detention facility for corruption in 2013 and 
was released in 2018. He has since visited Yap and has 




Tourism Pacific Island Times. 
Micronesia Forum. 
64 2017 “In November 2017, the Chinese government ordered 
tour operators to stop selling package tours to Palau, 
with reports that doing so could lead to fines. Palauan 
tour operators and government officials bridle at 
suggestions the ban has brought Palau to its knees—
there were still 9,000 visitor arrivals in July—but 














65 2018 “The number of Chinese visitors to Palau had increased 
from just 634 people in the 2008 financial year to 
87,000 during 2015, according to figures from Palau’s 
Bureau of Immigration and the South Pacific Tourism 
















Local Impact Source 
seemingly randomly banned state-run package tours 
from visiting the country — Chinese arrivals 
plummeted to 58,000. Analysts have suggested Palau’s 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan — being one of its 17 
remaining allies worldwide — combined with 
Beijing’s ability to control and oversee its tourists have 
a lot to do with it.” 
66 2018 “Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine narrowly 
survived a vote of no confidence Monday, seeing off a 
challenge she alleges was orchestrated by Chinese-
backed business interests’ intent on undermining the 
Pacific nation’s sovereignty. She said the no-
confidence motion was prompted by her government’s 
refusal to back plans for an independently administered 







South China Morning Post. 
Marshall Islands Leader 








67 2018 “China reportedly has plans to turn Rongelap, an atoll 
that was close to U.S. nuclear test sites that is inhabited 
by just 20 people, into a special administrative zone 
that would include a tax-free port and offshore 








Nikkei Asian Review. 





68 2018 “The Mayor of Rongelap atoll, James Matayoshi, 
addressed hundreds of entrepreneurs, government 
officials and politicians in Hong Kong. There, at the 
Asia World Expo in April, he unveiled his grand design 
for Rongelap, a remote coral atoll of 61 islets that sits 
just 3 meters above sea level. It would become the 
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“Chinese mothers commonly visit Saipan to give birth 
to their children in hopes that their children will 






South China Morning Post. 
Chinese Mothers Flock to 







70  “Chinese casinos continue operating in Saipan, 
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